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LETHAL INJECTION SECRECY AND EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS 
ERIC BERGER∗ 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that death row inmates possess an 
Eighth Amendment right protecting them against execution methods posing a 
substantial risk of serious harm. Despite the clear existence of this liberty inter-
est, lower federal courts have repeatedly denied inmates’ requests to know im-
portant details of the lethal injection procedure the state plans to use. This Article 
argues that the Eighth Amendment includes an implicit due process right to know 
such information about the state’s planned method of execution. Without this in-
formation, inmates cannot protect their Eighth Amendment right against an ex-
cruciating execution, because the state can conceal crucial details of its execution 
procedure, effectively insulating it from judicial review. As in other constitutional 
contexts, then, due process norms require that the government provide people 
with information necessary to protect their other constitutional rights. These 
norms similarly require courts, rather than administrative agencies, to judge the 
execution procedure’s constitutionality. Judicial recognition of this due process 
right would both protect Eighth Amendment values and also encourage states to 
make their execution procedures more transparent and less dangerous. Just as 
importantly, judicial recognition would also discourage secretive governmental 
practices more generally, thereby promoting openness and fair process as im-
portant democratic values. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Michael Taylor’s execution date was just days away in February 2014 
when he won what appeared to be a significant legal victory. Taylor, a death 
row inmate in Missouri, had sued the Apothecary Shoppe, an Oklahoma com-
pounding pharmacy that had allegedly contracted to supply Missouri with 
compounded pentobarbital for use in its lethal injection procedure. Taylor’s 
lawyers alleged that “compounding injectable pentobarbital outside an FDA-
approved facility poses a substantial risk that the purity, efficacy, and sterility 
of the drug will be compromised such that a tortuous death will result.”1 The 
allegation was hardly fanciful. On the contrary, experts had identified the dan-
gers of compounded pentobarbital, and recent executions using that drug in 
other states had gone awry.2 Perhaps recognizing that litigation may be expen-
sive and attract bad publicity, the Apothecary Shoppe settled, agreeing not to 
provide drugs to Missouri.3 
Taylor’s victory did not last long. Shortly after the settlement, Missouri 
Governor Jay Nixon announced that the State would proceed with Taylor’s 
execution anyway.4 Nixon refused to specify the drugs his State would use, but 
he cryptically suggested that Missouri had access to lethal chemicals from an-
other source.5 Taylor, who had filed suit against the State as well, moved to 
stay his execution on the grounds that Missouri could not substitute a new drug 
at the last minute.6 The next day, Missouri disclosed that it still planned to use 
pentobarbital in Taylor’s execution7 but again refused to disclose the drug’s 
source.8 
Viewed in the abstract, Taylor still seemed to have viable Eighth Amend-
ment and due process arguments. Missouri had acknowledged that it planned 
to use pentobarbital, but the only company manufacturing injectable pentobar-
bital available in the United States had prohibited sale of its drugs for use in 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Taylor v. Apothecary 
Shoppe, No. 14-CV-063-TCK-TLW (N.D. Ok. Feb. 18, 2014). 
 2 See id.; infra notes 103–121 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers of compounded 
pentobarbital and gruesome executions using that drug). 
 3 See Assoc. Press, Tulsa Pharmacy Agrees Not to Provide Execution Drug, CBSNEWS.COM 
(Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/oklahoma-pharmacy-agrees-not-to-provide-drug-for-
execution/, archived at http://perma.cc/U8SC-YTZT. 
 4 See Tony Rizzo & Jason Hancock, Missouri Execution of Michael Taylor Remains on Track, 
Governor Says, KANSAS CITY STAR (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/2014/02/18/
4831828/missouri-execution-on-track-governor.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7537-EW3Y. 
 5 See id. 
 6 See Plaintiff Michael Taylor’s Motion for Stay of Execution Based on Absence of Lawful 
Means of Execution at 2, Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-4209-CV-C-BP (W.D. Mo. Feb. 18, 2014). 
 7 See Suggestions in Opposition to Plaintiff Taylor’s Motion for Stay of Execution at 2, Zink, No. 
12-4209-CV-C-BP [hereinafter Zink Opposition Suggestions]. 
 8 See id. 
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executions.9 Because injectable pentobarbital’s shelf life is limited, Missouri 
almost certainly planned to use compounded pentobarbital, which, at least ar-
guably, creates serious risks that manufactured pentobarbital does not.10 Given 
these concerns and eyewitness accounts of problematic executions using com-
pounded pentobarbital elsewhere, Taylor had a strong argument that the State 
should disclose its execution procedure details for closer inspection. Perhaps 
further inquiry would demonstrate the “safety” of Missouri’s drugs and proce-
dures,11 but Taylor had raised colorable claims that the State’s planned execu-
tion created a substantial risk of serious pain in violation of his Eighth 
Amendment right against “cruel and unusual punishment.”12 
The courts rejected Taylor’s arguments. The federal district court in Mis-
souri denied his motions, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari and the application for a 
stay of execution.13 Collectively, these orders prevented Taylor from learning 
crucial details about Missouri’s execution procedure. While the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s Judge Bye did issue a stinging dissent, arguing that a stay should be 
granted so that Taylor “be allowed access to information and testing so he 
could determine whether his constitutional rights were to be violated at the 
time of his death,”14 the two appellate courts rejected Taylor’s contentions 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Press Release, Lundbeck, Lundbeck Divests Several Products in the US as Part of Long-
Term Business Strategy (Dec. 22, 2011), http://investor.lundbeck.com/releasedetail.cfm?-ReleaseID=
635094, archived at http://perma.cc/6WAH-9S4H. 
 10 See Assoc. Press, Missouri Officials Declined Comment on Execution Supply, NEWS-
LEADER.COM (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.news-leader.com/article/20140219/NEWS11/302190090/
Missouri-officials-declined-comment-on-execution-supply, archived at http://perma.cc/H75V-RNWJ; 
infra notes 103–121 and accompanying text. 
 11 A “safe” execution or drug in the lethal injection context is one that does not pose a substantial 
risk of serious pain, thereby complying with the Eighth Amendment standard announced by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees. See 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008) (plurality opinion). Obviously, to the 
extent the drugs are used to cause the death of a human being, they are not “safe” in the common 
sense of the word. 
 12 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This Article focuses on Eighth Amendment method-of-
execution claims. In different contexts, the Eighth Amendment protects against, inter alia, inhumane 
prison conditions, sentences disproportionately harsh to the crime committed, and particular sentences 
for certain classes of criminal defendants, such as juveniles or the mentally disabled. See, e.g., Kenne-
dy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 407 (2008) (invalidating death penalty for people whose crimes did not 
result in death of victim); Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (invalidating death penalty for 
people who committed their crimes as juveniles); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 679 (1978) (consid-
ering constitutionality of prison conditions). 
 13 See Taylor v. Lombardi, 132 S. Ct. 1375, 1375 (2014); Taylor v. Bowersox, 14-1403, slip op. 
at 2 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 2014); Zink, No. 12-04209-CV-C-BP, slip op. at 1. 
 14 See Bowersox, 14-1403, slip op. at 4 (Bye, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with order denying peti-
tion for rehearing en banc). 
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without even explaining their rulings.15 (Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, did issue a brief dissent saying that she would have 
granted the stay for the reasons “well stated by Judge Bye.”)16 On February 26, 
2014, Missouri executed Michael Taylor. 
The State and courts’ approaches to Taylor’s case were hardly anomalous. 
On the contrary, in recent years, states have become increasingly secretive 
about their lethal injection procedures.17 Although states typically make some 
information available, they often withhold vital details that directly affect the 
likelihood that the inmate will suffer excruciating pain. Courts, for their part, 
often turn a blind eye to these state practices, usually rejecting inmates’ re-
quests to learn this crucial information.18 
These state practices and judicial responses are deeply entrenched, but 
they are also wrong. Indeed, courts in these cases have repeatedly misunder-
stood both the law and the facts. Judicial sanction of lethal injection secrecy 
ignores important due process principles and abdicates the courts’ duty to en-
sure that states do not violate the Constitution. Courts also ignore a history of 
botched executions that belie their common assumption that lethal injection is 
unproblematic. To be sure, some execution procedures, upon closer examina-
tion, may be safe and constitutional, but some certainly are not, and courts 
have no way of distinguishing the safe from the dangerous without inquiring 
into the details of the procedure. To this extent, courts have repeatedly blessed 
risky execution procedures without bothering to examine them. 
This Article argues that courts confronted with Eighth Amendment chal-
lenges to lethal injection procedures should require states to provide inmate 
plaintiffs with details bearing on the risk that they will suffer serious pain.19 As 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Taylor, 132 S. Ct. at 1375; Bowersox, 14-1403 at *1 (majority opinion). To be fair, the 
Supreme Court usually does not comment when it denies requests for stays of execution and petitions 
for certiorari, though when one or more Justices dissent, perhaps it should. 
 16 Taylor, 132 S. Ct. at 1375. 
 17 See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1376 (2014). 
 18 See Taylor, 132 S. Ct. at 1375; Bowersox, 14-1403 at *2; infra notes 175–205 and accompany-
ing text. 
 19 Inmates potentially may gain access to execution procedures under various legal theories. For 
example, in some states, inmates may seek the information under a state Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), though many states specifically exempt execution procedures from their state FOIAs. See 
infra notes 147–152 and accompanying text. Some inmates have also argued that the First Amend-
ment provides them a right of access to the information and a right to petition the government for a 
redress of grievance that can only be vindicated by disclosure of sensitive information. See Wood v. 
Ryan, No. 14-16310, slip op. at 25 (9th Cir. July 19, 2014) (granting a preliminary injunction because, 
inter alia, the plaintiff has raised “serious questions” as to the “merits of his First Amendment 
claim”), rev’d, No. 14-5323, 2014 WL 3593088, at *1 (U.S. July 22, 2014); Cal. First Amendment 
Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2002); Schad v. Brewer, CV-13-2001-PHX-ROS, 
2013 WL 5551668, at *9 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2013) (holding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in 
argument that state’s deliberate concealment of information about the lethal-injection drugs violated 
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an initial matter, civil plaintiffs enjoy broad access to discovery, with which 
state privilege laws cannot interfere in federal question cases.20 From this per-
spective, inmates bringing Eighth Amendment lethal injection challenges un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to information about the state’s execution 
procedures under the ordinary rules of civil discovery without even having to 
assert a due process claim. 
Due process arguments make this right to discovery even stronger. Death 
row inmates unquestionably possess an Eighth Amendment right protecting 
them against methods of execution that create a substantial risk of serious 
harm.21 A state, then, violates the Constitution when it employs an execution 
procedure creating such risk. This right, however, only has force if courts en-
force it ex-ante—that is, if courts enjoin dangerous execution procedures and 
require states to adopt safer ones before executing an inmate.22 Nevertheless, 
many states, like Missouri, typically conceal crucial details of their execution 
procedures from inmates as well as the public, thereby effectively preventing 
inmates from safeguarding their Eighth Amendment rights.23 This secrecy not 
only violates the condemned’s constitutional rights but also heightens the risk 
that executions will cause excruciating pain. Indeed, in recent years, there have 
been several instances of botched executions, often involving grisly accounts 
of inmates convulsing or crying out from the gurney.24 
Without access to information about execution protocols, the inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment protection against unconstitutional executions evaporates, 
because the state can conceal details of its execution procedure, thereby insu-
lating it from judicial review. To safeguard the inmate’s Eighth Amendment 
right, then, courts should require states to disclose all material details of their 
execution procedures.25 This right likewise should encompass a right to know 
the state’s last-minute material changes to its procedure. 
                                                                                                                           
their First Amendment right of access to governmental proceedings); Nathaniel A.W. Crider, What 
You Don’t Know Will Kill You: A First Amendment Challenge to Lethal Injection Secrecy, COLUM. J. 
L. & SOC. PROB. (manuscript at 3) (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425017, archived at http://perma.cc/4LC7-LB38 (arguing that the press 
has a qualified First Amendment right of access to information about lethal injection drugs). Finally, 
both state and federal governments are contemplating new regulations on compounding pharmacies 
that may require “an unprecedented degree of transparency” from death penalty states. See Denno, 
supra note 17, at 1376. This Article focuses on due process arguments. 
 20 See FED. R. EVID. 501; FED. R. CIV. P. 26; infra 206–239 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
22 These injunctions can be tailored so as not to intrude unnecessarily on state prerogatives. See 
Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
259, 315–25 (2009); infra notes 356–419 and accompanying text. 
 23 See, e.g., MO. STAT. ANN. § 546.270(2)–(3) (West 2007); infra notes 147–152 and accompany-
ing text. 
 24 See infra notes 117–138 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 206–355 and accompanying text. 
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The question of whether inmates possess a constitutional right to know 
how they will be executed has recurred frequently in the lower federal courts 
and will continue to arise. The issue has received prominent attention in the 
mainstream media26 and even from Stephen Colbert.27 Nevertheless, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has ducked the issue repeatedly, most recently denying certio-
rari in a pair of cases in April 2014.28 The legal academy also has neglected to 
examine the issue so far. Deborah Denno has discussed state secrecy in her 
excellent, comprehensive study of recent developments in lethal injection,29 
but scholars have not yet examined whether state secrecy in lethal injection 
violates inmates’ due process rights. 
The question, however, is an important one that deserves more careful 
exploration. To the extent lower courts have addressed the issue, they usually 
reject the asserted right to information without adequately wrestling with the 
constitutional norms involved.30 Indeed, courts’ analyses to date emphasize 
only the state’s interests in proceeding with its execution and shortchange the 
inmate’s constitutional interests. 
Were courts to consider the question more carefully, they would see that 
the Supreme Court has emphasized that due process and basic fairness demand 
that litigants receive notice of the state’s plans for them and an opportunity to 
challenge those plans.31 The Court has similarly recognized a right to infor-
mation where an individual needs such information to protect a threatened 
constitutional right. The Court has also recognized that protection of a substan-
tive right often depends not only on the contours of the right itself but also on 
whether the government’s procedures are sufficiently sensitive to the right in 
question.32 
Nonetheless, concerns driving lower courts’ rejection of these arguments 
are understandable. For instance, courts often worry that increased scrutiny of 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Deciding If Death Row Inmates Get to Know How They’ll Be Killed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/us/deciding-if-death-row-inmates-
get-to-know-how-theyll-be-killed.html?hp, archived at http://perma.cc/9YJQ-GNXR. 
 27 See The Colbert Report: The Word—Silent But Deadly (Comedy Central television broadcast 
Apr. 2, 2014), available at http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/o639ag/the-word—silent-but-deadly, 
archived at http://perma.cc/D7XX-VLBE. 
 28 See In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888, 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1790 
(Apr. 7, 2014), reh’g denied, 741 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2014); Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 418 
(5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1789 (Apr. 7, 2014). 
 29 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1376–81. 
 30 See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 895–98; Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 418–21; Valle v. Singer, 
655 F.3d 1223, 1236–38 n.13 (11th Cir. 2011); Beaty v. Brewer, 791 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685–86 (D. 
Ariz. 2011), aff’d, 649 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011); Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1282–83 
(M.D. Ala. 2011). 
 31 See infra notes 240–291 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 292–355 and accompanying text.  
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lethal injection procedures may unmask the identities of the execution teams. 
Courts similarly worry that examination of the drug sources will pressure 
pharmacies to stop supplying chemicals used in executions. These concerns 
reflect legitimate state interests,33 but they also overstate the problem. Courts 
are fully capable of fashioning procedures, such as neutral chemical testing, 
that grant inmates evidence needed to evaluate the safety of execution proce-
dures while guarding against public dissemination of sensitive information, 
such as executioner and pharmacy identities.34 
Importantly, judicial recognition of an Eighth Amendment due process 
right is not only consistent with basic constitutional principles but would also 
result in safer executions.35 States often create their lethal injection procedures 
in secret without oversight or transparency.36 Little incentive therefore exists 
for states to ensure that executions do not cause pain, especially when they can 
either conceal an inmate’s pain (through the use of a paralytic in the three-drug 
protocol) or argue that apparent pain is not what it seems.37 The result can be 
execution procedures that create far more risk of pain than they should. In fact, 
recent botched executions may have been avoidable had the state disclosed 
important details.38 
Beyond the execution procedures themselves, these cases also implicate 
more fundamental notions of good governance.39 When state officials operate 
behind closed doors and are accountable neither to the public nor to elected 
officials, they effectively act without democratic legitimacy. This lack of ac-
countability is troubling, but it is perhaps justifiable where administrative 
agents possess an expertise that makes them uniquely suited to a handle sensi-
tive matters. When it comes to lethal injection, however, responsible state offi-
cials often lack not only political accountability, but also a basic understanding 
of the drugs and their risks.40 Far from deserving judicial deference, these 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Although death penalty opponents may object that capital punishment should not constitute a 
legitimate state interest, the constitutionality of the death penalty per se is not at issue in these cases. 
Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (ending the moratorium on capital punishment 
imposed by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam)). Indeed, by stipulating 
that the government may not take life without due process of law, the Constitution implies the theoret-
ical legitimacy of capital punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend XIV (“[N]or shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 34 See infra notes 357–384 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 457–485 and accompany text. 
 36 See infra notes 141–174 and accompany text. 
 37 See infra notes 50–174 and accompany text. 
 38 See infra notes 457–485 and accompanying text.  
 39 See infra notes 486–519 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in Con-
stitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2038–40, 2082 (2011). 
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kinds of governmental actions are precisely the kinds that warrant closer judi-
cial scrutiny.41 Courts, however, have effectively turned a blind eye to state 
practices, thereby letting these political process failures fester. 
Justice Felix J. Frankfurter once noted that “[t]he history of American 
freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”42 From this per-
spective, courts’ repeated deference to even the most secretive and suspicious 
practices should concern not just opponents of capital punishment, but all of 
us. Society has an interest in knowing whether the government abides by the 
Constitution when it carries out its most solemn task. To this extent, courts 
should recognize that lethal injection cases implicate core American norms, 
including fair process and transparent, accountable government.43 
Part I of this Article opens with a brief history of lethal injection in the 
United States, tracking the development of the three-drug protocol and the 
eventual shift to a one-drug protocol in several states, including the recent turn 
to drugs produced by compounding pharmacies.44 In so doing, it highlights the 
dangers of the states’ procedures and discusses the states’ often inadequate ef-
forts to deal with such dangers. Part I then examines state secrecy in lethal in-
jection practices and judicial sanction of that secrecy.45 
Part II opens by explaining that inmate plaintiffs should be permitted dis-
covery into the details of lethal injection procedures under Federal Rule of 
Procedure 26(b).46 Beyond the right to ordinary discovery, inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment right also should encompass a due process right to know the 
method by which the state plans to execute them. Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has insisted on similar rights to information and fair process in a variety of 
other constitutional cases implicating different individual rights. Although 
states, admittedly, have interests that may sometimes be frustrated by the 
recognition of this right, those interests can often be accommodated by careful-
ly crafted judicial procedures. 
Part III explores the implications of an Eighth Amendment due process 
right in the legal injection context and argues that the recognition of such a 
right will result in safer executions.47 Perhaps even more importantly, such 
recognition will help discourage the kinds of political process failures that of-
ten persist in the execution setting. 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See id. 
 42 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945). 
 43 See infra notes 240–270, 486–519 and accompanying text. 
  44 See infra notes 48–140 and accompanying text. 
  45 See infra notes 141–205 and accompanying text. 
  46 See infra notes 206–439 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 457–519 and accompanying text. 
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I. LETHAL INJECTION SECRECY 
This Part describes the evolution of lethal injection procedures and judi-
cial responses to Eighth Amendment challenges to those procedures. Section A 
briefly recounts the history of lethal injection and its dangers. Section B ex-
plains states’ efforts to keep their lethal injection procedures secret. Section C 
discusses how courts tend to condone such efforts. 
A. A Concise History of Lethal Injection and Its Dangers 
1. Lethal Injection from 1977–2008 
Execution procedures in the United States have changed through the dec-
ades. Partially because the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amend-
ment to bar punishments “incompatible with the ‘evolving standards of decen-
cy that mark the progress of a maturing society,’”48 methods of execution once 
widely accepted have since been largely abandoned. As the Court has recount-
ed, “[t]he firing squad, hanging, the electric chair, and the gas chamber have 
each in turn given way to more humane methods, culminating in today’s con-
sensus on lethal injection.”49 
Lethal injection procedures themselves have also changed, especially re-
cently. In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state to adopt lethal injection.50 It 
designed a three-drug protocol consisting of thiopental, an ultra-short-acting 
barbiturate anesthetic; pancuronium bromide, a paralytic inhibiting muscle 
movement; and potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest.51 Over the 
next twenty-five years, thirty-seven states followed Oklahoma’s lead and 
adopted this three-drug protocol.52 They did so, however, without conducting 
their own evaluation of the procedure.53 Instead, because it was easier to copy 
another state’s procedure than to design a new one, state officials mimicked 
Oklahoma’s approach without actually examining its benefits and risks.54 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
 49 Baze, 553 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion). 
 50 Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death 
Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 65 (2007). 
 51 See Mark Dershwitz & Thomas K. Henthorn, The Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics 
of Thiopental as Used in Lethal Injection, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 931, 931 n.2 (2008). 
 52 See Berger, supra note 22, at 302; Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The 
Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About 
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 90–120 (2002). 
 53 See Berger, supra note 22, at 302; Denno, supra note 50, at 70–75; Teresa A. Zimmers & Le-
onidas G. Koniaris, Peer-Reviewed Studies Identifying Problems in the Design and Implementation of 
Lethal Injection for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 921 (2008). 
 54 See Berger, supra note 22, at 302; Denno, supra note 52, at 90–120. 
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This three-drug procedure, however, created serious risks of excruciating 
pain. It is undisputed that potassium chloride causes agonizing pain as it burns 
its way through the veins to the heart.55 It is furthermore undisputed that pan-
curonium bromide masks such pain.56 Because pancuronium bromide also par-
alyzes the diaphragm, it can also cause the terrifying sensation of suffocation.57 
The constitutionality of the three-drug procedure therefore depends primarily 
on whether the first drug, the anesthetic, takes proper effect.58 When it does, 
the inmate is fully anesthetized within two-and-a-half minutes. If it does not, 
the paralyzed inmate may lie seemingly peacefully while experiencing the dual 
agony of suffocation and intense burning throughout his body.59 
The three-drug protocol became the subject of numerous lawsuits, con-
tending that states’ procedures created too great a risk that the inmate would 
suffer an excruciating death in violation of the Eighth Amendment.60 These 
suits necessarily inquired into the particulars of each state’s procedure, rather 
than the merits of the three-drug protocol in the abstract.61 Because the safety 
of the procedure hinged on the successful delivery of thiopental, these cases 
often turned on whether the state took adequate precautions to ensure that the 
inmate was, in fact, anesthetized before the delivery of the second and third 
drugs.   
It turned out that the states were not always competent. For example, a 
doctor who ran Missouri’s procedure admitted that he was dyslexic and could 
not say how much anesthetic he mixed.62 Other states had difficulty placing the 
catheter correctly in the inmate’s veins, thus causing infiltration, the process by 
which drugs spill into the tissue surrounding the vein. Infiltration appears to 
have caused Florida’s excruciating execution of Angel Diaz, who lay writhing 
                                                                                                                           
 55 See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Dershwitz & Henthorn, 
supra note 51, at 931. 
 56 Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84; Suzanne C. Beyea, Addressing the Trauma of Anesthesia 
Awareness, 81 AORN J. 603, 603–05 (2005). 
 57 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 55; Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84; Beyea, supra note 56, at 603–
05; Clare Wilson, Surgery Patients Report Waking up during Surgery but Unable to Let Doctors 
know, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/surgery-
patients-report-waking-up-during-surgery-but-unable-to-let-doctors-know/2014/10/06/56ecec8a-3a84-
11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html (summarizing study detailing terrifying experience of awakening 
while paralyzed). 
 58 See Ty Alper, Anesthetizing the Public Conscience: Lethal Injection and Animal Euthanasia, 
35 FORD. URB. L.J. 817, 818–20 (2008). 
 59 Henthorn Expert Report ¶ 24, Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 2006); 
Dershwitz & Henthorn, supra note 51, at 933–36. 
 60 See, e.g., Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 872; Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035 at *1; Morales v. 
Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048 (2006). 
 61 See Berger, supra note 22, at 266. 
 62 See Taylor, 2006 WL 1779035, at *7; Dr. John Doe Deposition. at 20–25, Taylor, No. 05-4173 
[hereinafter Doe Deposition]. 
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and gasping on the gurney for thirty-four minutes before dying.63 A doctor 
subsequently described the chemical burns on Diaz’s arm as “the kind of injury 
we see when a kid has fallen in a campfire or set his arm on fire.”64 In still oth-
er states, the complicated systems of remote drug administration prevented 
officials from knowing whether an inmate was properly anesthetized before the 
delivery of the second and third drugs.65  
The U.S. Supreme Court in 2008 considered the constitutionality of Ken-
tucky’s three-drug protocol in Baze v. Rees.66 Baze was, in many ways, a 
strange test case because Kentucky’s lethal injection procedure was among the 
more carefully designed.67 For instance, Kentucky took various precautionary 
measures absent in other states, such as using a phlebotomist68 to insert the 
catheters, requiring wardens to remain in the execution chamber with the pris-
oner to watch for problems with the intravenous (“IV”) lines,69 and requiring 
its team to participate in at least ten practice sessions per year.70 Moreover, the 
Kentucky plaintiff’s discovery into the details of the procedure had been ex-
tremely limited, so his legal team was unlikely to identify problems that may 
have existed.71 
Given Baze’s sparse record, it was unsurprising that the Court upheld the 
Kentucky protocol.72 Due to the limited record, however, the Court’s decision 
did not imply the validity of three-drug procedures in other states.73 Baze did, 
however, attempt to set forth the substantive standard under which future 
Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims would be considered.74 The 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See FLORIDA GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON ADMIN. OF LETHAL INJECTION, FINAL REPORT WITH 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2007) (finding “[f]ailure of the training of the [Florida] execu-
tion team members”); Phil Long & Marc Caputo, Lethal Injection Takes 34 Minutes to Kill Inmate, 
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 14, 2006, at 5B. 
 64 Ben Crair, Photos from a Botched Execution, NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 2014 http://www.
newrepublic.com/article/117898/lethal-injection-photos-angel-diazs-botched-execution-florida, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/E3KR-YH5C. 
 65 See Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (describing difficulties of remote administration); Morales 
v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979–80 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (same); Berger, supra note 22, at 271–72. 
 66 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 35. 
 67 See Berger, supra note 22, at 279 n.102. 
 68 A phlebotomist is an individual trained to draw blood and insert catheters into veins. 
 69 IV lines are plastic tubes that run from the bottle or bag of medicine into a catheter placed in a 
vein in the body. See American Cancer Society, Tubes and IV Lines, archived at http://www.cancer.
org/treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/physicalsideeffects/dealingwithsymptomsathome/caring-for-
the-patient-with-cancer-at-home-tubes-and-iv-lines, archived at http://perma.cc/PC65-Z2P2. 
 70 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 53–55; Berger, supra note 22, at 274. 
 71 See Berger, supra note 22, at 274, 279. 
 72 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 63; Berger, supra note 22, at 274, 279. 
 73 See Berger, supra note 22, at 274–79. 
 74 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. Although Chief Justice Roberts wrote only for himself, Justice Ken-
nedy, and Justice Alito, his opinion constituted the narrowest grounds supporting the judgment and 
therefore is treated as the holding of the court. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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plurality opinion explained that to make out a successful Eighth Amendment 
method-of-execution challenge, the plaintiff must establish that the current 
procedure poses “a substantial risk of serious harm.”75 Baze, thus, made it clear 
that “subjecting individuals to a risk of future harm—not simply actually in-
flicting pain—can qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.”76 The plurality 
further stated that the plaintiff must establish that the state has refused to adopt 
a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative that “significantly” reduced the 
risk.77 Baze therefore suggests that a plaintiff must not only allege that the 
state’s lethal injection procedure creates a substantial risk of serious pain, but 
must also proffer an alternative method significantly reducing that risk. 
It should be noted that there remains serious disagreement about the Baze 
standard, a point that some Justices made even as the decision was issued.78 As 
Professor Denno argues, Baze alludes to several risk standards and, conse-
quently, provides scant guidance to lower courts.79 It is therefore unsurprising 
to learn that lower courts have applied a variety of Eighth Amendment stand-
ards since Baze.80 For example, courts disagree as to whether inmates must 
proffer an alternative method if they can demonstrate the dangers of the state’s 
existing method.81 Regardless, though the precise terms of the Eighth Amend-
ment standard are debatable, there is broad agreement that the risk that an exe-
cution procedure will cause serious pain is an important part of the legal calcu-
lus. 
                                                                                                                           
But see Justin Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the Eighth Amendment, and Plu-
rality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 217 (2009) (discussing the “futility” of discerning the “narrow-
est ground” so long as discord among the Justices remains). 
 75 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
 76 Id. at 49.  
 77 Id. at 52. 
 78 See id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the plurality’s opinion, far from settling the 
issue, will generate further debate); id. at 94 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the plurality opin-
ion “casts constitutional doubt on long-accepted methods of execution”). 
 79 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1347–48. 
 80 See id. at 1348 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 34–35, (1993)) (citing lower 
court cases stating that the procedure must be “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers” in order to violate the Eighth Amend-
ment). 
 81 See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 899–900 (Bye, J., dissenting) (discussing the disagree-
ment). The Eighth Circuit’s recent decision to stay Russell Bucklew’s execution also indicates that in 
certain circumstances inmates may be excused from proffering an alternative method. See Bucklew v. 
Lombardi, No. 14-2163, 2014 WL 2724648, at *1 (8th Cir. May 20, 2014) (“[T]he requirement for an 
inmate to set forth an alternative method for execution does not apply in a case like this involving a 
specific, medically-based, as-applied, individual challenge to a method of execution.”). 
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2. Lethal Injection Since 2008 
Less than two months after Baze, an Ohio state court held in State v. Rive-
ra that “the use of two drugs in the lethal injection protocol (pancuronium 
bromide and potassium chloride) creates an unnecessary and arbitrary risk that 
the condemned will experience an agonizing and painful death.”82 For a reme-
dy, the court ordered the State to adopt a one-drug protocol using only an anes-
thetic, a change that Ohio ultimately adopted by statute.83 In Baze, the Su-
preme Court had rejected the plaintiff’s proffered alternative of a one-drug 
procedure, in large part because no state had ever tried it.84 Ohio’s break from 
the three-drug procedure signaled a sea-change in lethal injection and also lim-
ited Baze’s precedential impact.85 Baze had indicated that a lethal injection 
protocol “substantially similar” to Kentucky’s would pass constitutional mus-
ter,86 raising difficult questions about how to determine whether other states’ 
three-drug protocols were, in fact, “substantially similar.”87 This question be-
came moot in several states after Rivera when twelve more states, following 
Ohio’s lead, adopted one-drug procedures relying on anesthetics like thiopental 
or pentobarbital.88 
These states’ shift to a one-drug protocol ostensibly alleviated Eighth 
Amendment concerns. After all, by adopting an anesthetic as the sole drug for 
execution procedures, these states eliminated the two drugs that had created 
the primary risk of pain in the first place. Almost immediately, however, states 
with both three and one-drug procedures had difficulty obtaining the drugs 
they had selected.89 In 2010, Hospira, Inc., the sole U.S. manufacturer of thio-
pental, ceased domestic production of the drug at its domestic plant due to an 
“unspecified raw material supply problem.”90 Hospira subsequently decided 
                                                                                                                           
 82 State v. Rivera, No. 04CR065940, 2008 WL 2784679, at *6 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. June 10, 2008); 
Adam Liptak & Adam B. Ellick, Judge Orders Ohio to Alter Its Method of Execution, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 11, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/us/11death.html?r=0&page
wanted=print, archived at http://perma.cc/3W5K-V9JW?type=pdf.  
 83 See Liptak & Ellick, supra note 82. 
 84 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 41. 
 85 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1354–56. 
 86 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 61. 
 87 See Berger, supra note 22, at 276. 
 88 See State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection, archived at http://perma.cc/R5QE-MLA8 (last visited Oct. 
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dure. See id. 
 89 See generally James Gibson & Corinna Barrett Lain, Death Penalty Drugs and the Moral Mar-
ketplace, 103 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the impact that international norms are hav-
ing, through the marketplace, culture, and doctrine, in the death penalty context). 
 90 Carol J. Williams, Maker of Anesthetic Used in Executions is Discontinuing Drug, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/22/local/la-me-execution-drug-20110122, archived 
at http://perma.cc/E8LS-6JTC. 
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not to resume production of thiopental at its plant in Italy after Italian authori-
ties threatened legal action if Hospira could not prevent the drug from being 
used in executions.91 In explaining its decision, Hospira noted both the threat 
of liability in Europe and the fact that it had never “condoned” use of thiopen-
tal in executions.92 Similarly, in 2011, the Danish company Lundbeck, Inc., the 
world’s sole producer of injectable pentobarbital, announced that it would not 
sell the drug to states for use in executions and would require its customers to 
pledge not to resell the drug to prisons.93 Lundbeck subsequently sold the ex-
clusive rights to pentobarbital to Akorn, Inc., an American company, with the 
express condition that it not sell pentobarbital for use in executions for a given 
period.94 
As a result of these and related developments, states have taken increas-
ingly creative and legally dubious steps to procure drugs for their execution 
procedures. For example, Arizona, California, Tennessee, and possibly other 
states obtained thiopental from Dream Pharma, a “fly-by-night” middleman 
operating out of a west London driving school.95 Similarly, Nebraska pur-
chased thiopental for its three-drug procedure from a man in India who told the 
Swiss pharmaceutical company Naari AG that he would use their free samples 
to provide anesthetics in Zambia.96 Upon learning of the thiopental’s actual 
destination, Naari was appalled and demanded that Nebraska return the drug.97 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Press Release, Hospira, Inc., Hospira Statement Regarding Pentothal Market Exit (Jan. 21, 
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highlight, archived at http://perma.cc/Z5KV-Z4JF; DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, Lethal 
Injection Overview, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-moratorium-executions-ends-
after-supreme-court-decision, archived at http://perma.cc/C4EF-R5EJ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014); 
Denno, supra note 17, at 1360–61. 
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 95 See Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Gibson & Lain, supra note 89, at 8; Owen 
Bowcott, London Firm Supplied Drugs for U.S. Executions, GUARDIAN, Jan. 6, 2011, http://www.
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 96 See Assoc. Press, Swiss Company Demands Nebraska Return Drug Intended For Use In Lethal 
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ag-sodium-thiopental-2011-11#ixzz2uSzsNk2r, archived at http://perma.cc/PHQ2-FRRW. 
 97 See id. 
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The State, which had allegedly obtained the drugs under false pretenses, re-
fused.98  
Hoping to cut off drugs from these and other foreign sources, several 
death row inmates sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), arguing that 
state correctional departments’ importation of thiopental for executions violat-
ed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).99 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ruled for the inmates, upholding a district court decision enjoining the 
FDA from allowing the importation of apparently misbranded or unapproved 
thiopental for executions.100 The D.C. Circuit, thus, made clear that the FDCA 
requires the FDA to refuse admission to unapproved drugs, such as thiopental 
obtained from Dream Pharma.101 Though the court overturned the portion of 
the district court’s ruling ordering the FDA to require non-party states to return 
their imported thiopental,102 its ruling nevertheless effectively blocked states 
from continuing to seek unscrupulous overseas dealers. 
With their options ever-shrinking, states, including Missouri, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, and others, have sought drugs like pentobarbital from com-
pounding pharmacies, which, unlike “Big Pharma” manufacturing facilities, 
are subject to less rigorous, consistent regulation.103 Compounding pharmacies 
typically mix small batches of drugs to order, but because they escape many 
FDA regulations, their products often have not been evaluated for effectiveness 
and safety.104 Compounding pharmacies often also use active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (APIs) from complex, unsecured supply chains that can be diverted 
through “grey markets,” making it difficult or impossible to verify whether the 
ingredients and their specific production lots conform to FDA requirements.105 
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The chemicals, for example, may come from unregistered manufacturing 
plants in China and India, escaping all FDA oversight.106 It is also not uncom-
mon for compounding pharmacies’ ingredients to be mislabeled, resulting in 
final products that are not what they purport to be.107 
Compounding pharmacies perform an important service by mixing small 
batches of drugs to order, but they are only licensed to dispense drugs, not to 
manufacture them.108 Consequently, they often lack the basic infrastructure 
necessary to produce sterile, potent, safe injectable pentobarbital.109 As one 
expert put it, the process for producing injectable pentobarbital is “technologi-
cally too difficult to do outside of FDA-regulated facilities.”110 Moreover, FDA 
pharmacy inspections have found with alarming frequency that compounding 
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71f2b202721b_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NZ54-TGFD; Telephone Interview with Sarah 
Sellers, President, q-Vigilance, LLC (May 27, 2014) [hereinafter Sellers Interview]. 
 108 See Bette Hileman, Drug Regulation, C & EN (Apr. 12, 2004) at 24, archived at http://
perma.cc/LBG4-M4E4?type=pdf (discussing lack of regulation and capacities of compounding phar-
macies); Sellers Email, supra note 105. 
 109 See Sasich Declaration, supra note 106, ¶ 12; Jennifer Gudeman et al., Potential Risks of 
Pharmacy Compounding, 13 DRUGS R&D 1, 3 (2012), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3627035/, archived at http://perma.cc/QZ2V-9PLD (explaining that some com-
pounding pharmacies have expanded their activities beyond their technological capabilities and that 
“poor practices on the part of drug compounders can result in contamination or in products that do not 
possess the strength, quality, and purity required” for a safe drug); Mark Thomas et al., I.V. Admixture 
Contamination Rates: Traditional Practice Site Versus a Class 1000 Cleanroom, 62 AM. J. HEALTH-
SYST. PHARM. 2386 (2012), archived at http://perma.cc/V8R3-BW5P?type=pdf (finding contamina-
tion in compounded medication even when technicians compounded it in sterile environments, such a 
cleanroom); Sellers Email, supra note 105. 
 110 Sasich Declaration, supra note 106, ¶ 12. 
1384 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1367 
pharmacies purporting to produce sterile drug products did not follow proce-
dures designed to prevent microbiological contamination of those products.111 
As if these conditions were not dangerous enough, one compounding pharma-
cy in Mississippi allegedly conceded that it did not have the facilities to pro-
duce the drug itself, so it instead supplied that State’s Department of Correc-
tions with the raw materials to mix.112 Needless to say, if compounding phar-
macies lack the facilities to mix safe drugs, state prisons hardly provide an ac-
ceptable alternative. 
In short, many compounding pharmacies’ practices heighten the risk that 
their drugs will be dangerously contaminated, impure, sub-potent, super-
potent, or otherwise flawed.113 For example, contaminated steroids from a 
Massachusetts compounding pharmacy recently caused fungal meningitis in 
approximately 750 people, at least 64 of whom died.114 These horrific out-
comes are hardly coincidental. As one consultant on the FDA’s Science Board 
put it, “the potential harm associated with the use of such contaminated or sub-
potent drugs is extremely high.”115 As a result, one can only confirm the safety 
of compounded drugs by specifically testing each sample.116 
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In light of these dangers, it is unsurprising that states using compounded 
drugs in executions have experienced problems. When Oklahoma executed 
Michael Lee Wilson with compounded pentobarbital in January 2014, he cried 
out, “I feel my whole body burning!”117 This reaction is consistent with con-
taminated pentobarbital, which experts explain creates the excruciating sensa-
tion of sandpaper scraping the insides of a person’s veins.118 Similarly, when 
South Dakota executed Eric Robert with compounded pentobarbital in October 
2013, he gasped and snorted heavily, turned a blue-purplish hue, and took 20 
minutes to die.119 Subsequent analysis of the State’s pentobarbital supply indi-
cated that it was, in fact, contaminated.120 Similar episodes have occurred with 
compounded pentobarbital in other states as well.121 
To their credit, some states and courts have recognized lethal injection’s 
dangers and halted executions until a safe execution can be assured.122 But 
other states, unhindered by courts, push on with executions, even though their 
lethal injection procedures pose serious dangers.123 Several states have retained 
the problematic three-drug protocol, sometimes substituting pentobarbital or 
                                                                                                                           
 117 See Jason Hancock, Execution Secrecy Draws Criticism in Missouri, KANSAS CITY STAR, 
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at http://perma.cc/WWU4-BH9C. 
 118 See Sasich Declaration, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 61–63; Molly Redden, New Lethal Injections 
Could Cause Extreme Pain, Make Deaths “Drag On” for Hours, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/11/ohio-lethal-injection-cocktail-execution-drugs, ar-
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 120 See South Dakota Covers up Source of ‘DIY’ Death Penalty Drugs Ahead of Execution, RE-
PRIEVE (Oct. 30, 2012), http://www.reprieve.org.uk/press/ 2012_10_30_South_Dakota_execution_
drugs/, archived at http://perma.cc/ENN9-VTFD. 
 121 See, e.g., Elliot C. McLaughlin, Appeals Court Stays Texas Execution After Intellectual Disa-
bility Claim, CNN (May 12, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/13/justice/texas-execution-robert-
james-campbell/, archived at http://perma.cc/58NV-ZKP5 (noting that Jose Luis Villegas complained 
of a burning sensation during his April execution in Texas using compounded pentobarbital). 
 122 See Arthur v. Thomas, No. 2:11-CV-0438-MEF, 2013 WL 5434694, at *1357 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 
30, 2013) (permitting Eighth Amendment claims to proceed); Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854–55 
(Ark. 2012) (invalidating execution protocol under state constitution); Sims v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 
157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that execution procedure violated state law); 
Baze v. Thompson, No. 06-CI-574, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2013) (continuing injunction against 
executions); State v. Irick, No. M1987-00131-SC-DPE-DD slip op. at 1, (Tenn. Dec. 11, 2013) (staying 
execution to permit evaluation of new execution protocol); Kimberly Leonard, Lethal Injection Drug 
Access Could Put Executions on Hold, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.
publicintegrity.org/2012/04/04/8589/lethal-injectiondrug-access-could-put-executions-hold, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DK2W-ECD6. 
 123 See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 88. 
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midazolam as the first drug with disastrous consequences.124 For example, af-
ter the problematic execution of Michael Lee Wilson in January 2014, Okla-
homa substituted midazolam as its first drug in a three-drug procedure for a 
pair of April 2014 executions.125 This experiment yielded the State’s second 
botched execution in four months. After the administration of the first drug, a 
doctor declared Clayton Lockett unconscious and permitted the administration 
of the second and third drugs. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Lockett twitched, gasped, 
and called out, “Man . . . something’s wrong.”126 He then mumbled, shook his 
foot, and started convulsing violently, trying to rise up off the gurney and ex-
haling loudly.127 Prison officials subsequently discovered a “vein failure” be-
cause “the line had blown,” indicating that the midazolam, which was sup-
posed to have rendered the inmate unconscious, had, in the words of Oklaho-
ma’s Director of the Department of Corrections, “either absorbed into tissue, 
leaked out or both.”128 Whatever the precise cause, the first drug clearly failed 
to take proper effect, and, as a result, Mr. Lockett was subjected to excruciat-
ing pain.129 State officials finally attempted to halt the execution, but the in-
mate died anyway, forty-three minutes after the first injection.130 Though Ok-
lahoma Governor Mary Fallin issued an implausible statement that Lockett had 
remained unconscious during the process,131 the problems were so egregious 
that the State was forced to postpone the second execution scheduled for that 
same evening.132 The White House even took the unusual step of condemning 
the execution, stating that it fell short of the country’s standard that “even 
when the death penalty is justified, it must be carried out humanely.”133 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See id. States still using the three-drug protocol sometimes also use a paralytic other than pan-
curonium bromide, such as vecuronium bromide. 
 125 See Erick Eckholm, One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 
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 129 See Eckholm, supra note 126. 
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 131 See id. 
 132 See Eckholm, supra note 126. 
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Oklahoma is not the only state to experiment with midazolam and run in-
to difficulties. Ohio, for example, used midazolam as its first drug in an unusu-
al two-drug procedure for the execution of Dennis McGuire.134 This execution 
was also problematic; the inmate gasped and convulsed for ten to thirteen 
minutes and took twenty-four minutes to die.135 An anesthesiologist later re-
ported that McGuire probably experienced “true pain and suffering.”136 Arizo-
na also used midazolam for Joseph Wood’s execution with similarly horrific 
results; Mr. Wood loudly gasped repeatedly (600 times, according to one ac-
count) and took nearly two hours to die.137 Arizona Senator John McCain, a 
former prisoner of war, later referred to the execution as “torture.”138 
In light of this experience, it should be clear that lethal injection is hardly 
problem free and that at least some states use procedures that create substantial 
risks of serious pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment.139 States, in fact, 
have yet to design a lethal injection protocol that always proceeds smoothly. 
Indeed, the traditional three-drug procedure, variations of the three-drug pro-
cedure using midazolam, two-drug procedures, and one-drug procedures rely-
ing on compounded drugs have each caused serious problems in recent years. 
As we shall see, courts frequently assume that these executions are safe and 
that Eighth Amendment challenges to execution methods are frivolous.140 Giv-
en the history just recounted, this assumption is simply wrong. 
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B. State Secrecy in Lethal Injection 
Perhaps because they know their drugs and methods cannot be trusted, 
death penalty states often keep important details of their execution procedures 
secret.141 States have never been forthcoming about the details of their proce-
dures,142 but, as states’ procedures have become more haphazard and incon-
sistent in recent years, this problem has worsened.143 Indeed, as states increas-
ingly rely on unregulated compounding pharmacies for their drugs, the lack of 
transparency has grown even more pronounced.144 
Missouri’s behavior in the days leading up to Michael Taylor’s execution 
is emblematic of many states’ bid for secrecy. Though compounded pentobar-
bital increases the risk of a painful execution, Missouri refused even to admit 
that its drugs were compounded or to permit them to be tested.145 To assist the 
Department of Correction’s efforts to maintain such secrecy, a Missouri statute 
not only shields execution team members’ identities from disclosure, but goes 
so far as to create a civil cause of action against any person who discloses such 
information or discloses a record that might lead to the discovery of the identi-
ty of an execution team member,146 thereby discouraging journalists from in-
vestigating the State’s sketchy practices. 
Missouri is hardly alone. Approximately half of states with lethal injec-
tion do not allow external evaluation of their execution protocols.147 Colorado, 
for instance, tried to shield all details of its execution method from public scru-
tiny.148 Other states, including Pennsylvania, have sought to keep secret their 
reliance on drugs from compounding pharmacies.149 Georgia’s “Lethal Injec-
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1376 (raising “the disturbing possibility that states are knowingly 
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tion Secrecy Act” shields drug suppliers not only from public disclosure,150 but 
even from judicial scrutiny, classifying such information as a “confidential 
state secret.”151 Other states, including Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas have taken similar routes, passing 
statutes that officially deem execution procedures secret, sometimes explicitly 
exempting such materials from state Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in-
quiries.152 
State officials also work hard to conceal execution procedures. Officials 
in Oklahoma went so far as to defy and intimidate state judges who had taken 
the modest, hesitant step of contemplating hearing an inmate’s claims. After 
                                                                                                                           
 150 As Mary Fan argues, the confidentiality of lethal injection drug suppliers is analytically dis-
tinct from secrecy concealing the method of execution. See Mary D. Fan, Extending Executioner Con-
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the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a stay of execution so that the judiciary 
could determine whether death-row inmates were being denied “their constitu-
tional right to access to the courts,”153 Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin an-
nounced that the executive branch would not honor the stay.154 Not wishing to 
be outdone, a state legislator commenced impeachment proceedings against 
the five Justices who had voted in favor of the stay.155 The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court, perhaps buckling under this political pressure, subsequently held that 
state laws insulating lethal injection procedures from discovery were, in fact, 
valid and constitutional.156 Less than a week later, the State badly botched 
Clayton Lockett’s execution, using the very procedure about which Lockett 
had sought information.157 
State secrecy sometimes extends to events that transpire during execu-
tions. When things go wrong, states often draw the blinds of the execution 
chamber so that witnesses cannot see what is happening. For example, when it 
became clear that Lockett’s execution was going horribly awry, correctional 
officials closed the blinds, blocking the witnesses’ and media’s view until 
Lockett finally died 24 minutes later.158 States also sometimes cover the cathe-
ter with a sheet, making it impossible to see problems as they develop. During 
Lockett’s execution, for instance, the State covered the IV access site with a 
sheet, thus concealing an area of swelling “larger than a golf ball.”159 The 
swelling, of course, signaled that he drugs were infiltrating, entering not the 
vein but the surrounding tissues. Oklahoma’s practice of secrecy continued 
even after the botched Lockett execution, as state officials resisted requests for 
execution logs and related records.160 
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State secrecy in lethal injection has become so pervasive that some states 
withhold their reasons for secrecy. For example, when Texas Attorney General 
Greg Abbott announced that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice “must 
withhold” information about the pharmacists supplying drugs to the State, he 
cited a “threat assessment” from the Texas Department of Public Safety.161 He 
refused to release the assessment, however, deeming it “law enforcement sen-
sitive information.”162 
In fairness, it is important to note that some state justice departments have 
started to require more transparency, and most states usually do provide some 
information about their execution procedures.163 Inmates, for instance, know 
that the state plans to execute them with lethal injection, and, in most states, 
they also know the kind of drugs. State secrecy also varies widely between 
states. Several states publish some details of their execution protocol,164 and a 
few offer detailed protocols.165 Significantly, though, many states conceal in-
formation most vital to determining the safety of their procedure, including, 
inter alia, the qualifications of the person inserting the catheter into the in-
mates’ veins, the qualifications of the person mixing the drugs, the qualifica-
tions of the person monitoring the inmate’s anesthetic depth, the chemical 
properties of the actual drugs used, and the amounts of the drugs to be inject-
ed.166 
For example, Oklahoma’s execution protocol is conspicuously silent on 
several issues bearing directly on the risk of pain.167 Oklahoma devotes over 
half of its twenty-page protocol to issues largely unrelated to the safety of the 
procedure, providing detailed steps for notifying an offender of a scheduled 
execution, holding cell procedures, the selection of media witnesses, last meal 
requests, and persons allowed at an execution.168 The protocol, however, is less 
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precise on several important issues. For example, it is vague about the qualifi-
cations and training of several key members of the execution team, including 
the person inserting the IV-line into the inmate,169 the person monitoring the 
inmate’s consciousness after the delivery of the anesthetic,170 and the three 
people administering the drugs.171 It also lists five different possible drug com-
binations, thereby vesting the Warden with “sole discretion” to select the com-
bination to be used for each execution,172 thus creating even more uncertainty 
and unpredictability.  
To be sure, as discussed below, the states believe that secrecy furthers im-
portant interests. Most of these state interests, however, can be protected with 
far narrower measures.173 To this extent, the tremendous breadth of state secre-
cy suggests that states may guard the details of their execution procedures to 
conceal their own inconsistencies and incompetence.174 
C. Judicial Sanction of State Secrecy 
The majority of courts, especially federal appellate courts, have permitted 
states to keep secret important details from their lethal injection procedures.175 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example, has repeatedly 
rejected inmates’ requests for information about the method by which they will 
be executed.176 In Williams v. Hobbs, the Eighth Circuit rejected an Arkansas 
inmate’s asserted right to know the State’s lethal injection procedure, stating 
that inmates do not have a due process right to such information.177 In In re 
Lombardi, the Eighth Circuit considered the State of Missouri’s petition for a 
writ of mandamus that would prohibit, inter alia, laboratory tests verifying the 
State’s drugs for potency, purity, and sterility.178 Though the court recognized 
that mandamus is an “[e]xtraordinary” writ,179 it nevertheless granted the peti-
tion. In rejecting the plaintiff’s request for various details about the State’s ex-
ecution procedure, the Eighth Circuit bafflingly deemed the requested material 
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to be “plainly not relevant,”180 even though the safety of the execution proce-
dure hinges upon such details.181 In Taylor, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial 
court’s denial of information about the pentobarbital Missouri planned to use. 
Though the State had found new compounded pentobarbital less than a week 
before the execution and though significant evidence indicated that compound-
ed pentobarbital had caused pain in previous executions,182 the Eighth Circuit 
did not even offer reasoning, summarily affirming without comment.183 
Though the precise factual and procedural contexts differ, other federal 
appellate courts, including the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, have also 
rejected this right to information.184 In Sepulvado v. Jindal,185 for instance, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit overturned a trial court decision 
finding a due process right to information about an upcoming execution proce-
dure.186 In rejecting the argument that “an inmate who is to be executed cannot 
challenge a protocol as violative of the Eighth Amendment until he knows 
what that protocol contains,” the Sepulvado court simply responded that such 
an approach would “frustrate ‘the State’s significant interest in enforcing its 
criminal judgments.’”187 Other circuits have similarly rejected inmates’ chal-
lenges to last-minute drug substitutions.188 
These circuits’ apparent impatience for these claims is, to some extent, 
understandable, given that the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled its own hos-
tility to such arguments. In addition to denying inmates’ petitions for certiorari 
requesting access to execution procedure details,189 the Court has also taken 
the more dramatic step of reversing an order granting a temporary stay of exe-
cution so that the court could “fully consider [an inmate’s] challenge to Arizo-
na’s use of sodium thiopental obtained from an unidentified, non-FDA ap-
                                                                                                                           
 180 See id. at 897. 
 181 See supra notes 48–174 and accompanying text.  
 182 See Zink, No. 12-04209-CV-C-BP, slip op. at 2–3; Carey Gillam, Looming Missouri Execution 
Turns Spotlight on Lethal Injection Drugs, REUTERS (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/02/24/us-usa-missouri-execution-idUSBREA1N0UM20140224, archived at http://perma.
cc/TX9K-JU2Z. 
 183 See Bowersox, No. 14-1403, slip op. at 1 (affirming district court denial of motion for stay of 
execution). 
 184 See, e.g., Wellons v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.3d 1260, 1267 (11th Cir. 2014); 
Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072–73; Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 419; Valle, 655 F.3d at 1236 & n.13; Powell, 641 
F.3d at 1258. 
 185 729 F.3d at 413. 
 186 See id. at 419. 
 187 See id. (quoting Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 650 (2004)). 
 188 See, e.g., Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 161–63 (3d Cir. 2011); Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 
1336, 1337–38 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 189 See, e.g., Taylor, 132 S. Ct. at 1375; Sepulvado, 134 S. Ct. at 1789; Zink v. Lombardi, 132 S. 
Ct. 1790, 1790 (2014). 
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proved source.”190 The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, in Land-
rigan v. Brewer had emphasized that Arizona had denied the inmate “any in-
formation regarding the drug,”191 except to inform him less than a week before 
his execution that it planned to use a non-FDA approved drug.192 The Supreme 
Court, nevertheless, vacated the stay, explaining only that “[t]here is no evi-
dence in the record to suggest that the drug obtained from a foreign source is 
unsafe.”193 Of course, the State’s own refusal to share any information de-
prived the trial court of any meaningful record one way or another, which was 
why that court had granted the stay to permit further investigation.194 The Su-
preme Court, however, instead gave Arizona the benefit of the doubt and re-
fused to give Landrigan an opportunity to learn about the drugs the State 
would use to execute him. 
In fairness, some courts have recognized the importance of allowing the 
condemned access to a state’s execution plans.195 In Oken v. Sizer, for example, 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland emphasized that the State 
had changed the execution procedure just days before a scheduled execu-
tion.196 Although Maryland contended that the inmate’s request for the proce-
dure was untimely and that the court should trust the State to use a safe proto-
col not materially different from previous protocols, the district court ruled 
that, given the matter’s grave importance, the State “ask[ed] too much of Oken 
and of the Court.”197 Indeed, “[f]undamental fairness, if not due process, re-
quires that the execution protocol that will regulate an inmate’s death be for-
warded to him in prompt and timely fashion.”198 The court concluded by em-
phasizing that “[d]ue process requires nothing less—an opportunity to receive 
notice of how one’s rights will be affected and opportunity to respond and be 
heard.”199 More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Landrigan v. Brewer, No. 10–02246, 2010 WL 4269559, at *12 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2010), 
aff’d, 625 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 445 (Oct. 26, 2010) (vacating temporary re-
straining order). 
 191 Id. at *8. 
 192 See id. 
 193 Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 445. 
 194 See Landrigan, 2010 WL 4269559, at *12. 
 195 See, e.g., Sells & Llanas v. Livingston, No. H-14-832 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014) (entering pre-
liminary injunction requiring state to disclose under seal all information regarding procurement of 
drugs); Hill v. Owens, 2013-cv-233771 (Ga. Super. Ct. July 18, 2013) (granting stay of execution and 
finding substantial likelihood that statute prohibiting disclosure of all execution information is uncon-
stitutional), rev’d, 758 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. 2014); ACLU v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 13-CV-32325, slip 
op. at 6 (Denver Dist. Ct. Aug. 1, 2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/case/aclu-v-colorado-
department-of-corrections, archived at http://perma.cc/P4DV-EWZX. 
 196 321 F. Supp. 2d 658, 660 (D. Md. 2004). 
 197 Id. at 664. 
 198 See id.  
 199 Id. at 665 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)). 
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Ohio issued and then extended a moratorium on that State’s executions, attrib-
uting the delay to “the continuing need for discovery and necessary prepara-
tions related to the adoption and implementation of the new execution proto-
col.”200 Other courts, without explicitly reaching the due process question, 
have examined state lethal injection procedures closely, thereby signaling that 
a court cannot fairly rule on an inmate’s method-of-execution challenge if it 
lacks important information about the procedure in question.201 
Some dissenting judges have also echoed Oken’s recognition that inmates 
need adequate information about execution procedures “in order that they may 
determine whether or not their Eighth Amendment rights are being violat-
ed.”202 As Judge Bye noted in dissent, “Taylor is in an obviously disadvan-
taged position because Missouri has, perhaps drastically, changed how Taylor 
will be executed by substituting any number of new components and actors 
within the last week.”203 Without closer examination, Judge Bye added, there 
is no way to know whether the compounding pharmacy is any more competent 
than “a high school chemistry class.”204 The Ninth Circuit’s Judge Reinhardt in 
dissent similarly noted that a last minute change in protocol drugs raised a 
question of procedural due process, namely “whether an individual may be 
executed pursuant to a protocol substituted for the established means of execu-
tion, eighteen hours before the scheduled time of execution and without suffi-
cient opportunity even to present his constitutional objections.”205 This line of 
reasoning, however, represents the minority view. The majority view has re-
peatedly denied inmates this right to information, even when states make last 
minute changes to their execution procedures. 
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS 
This Part argues that courts should grant inmate plaintiffs access to in-
formation bearing on whether a state’s lethal injection procedure creates a risk 
of substantial pain. Section A argues that inmates have a right to this infor-
mation through discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 
                                                                                                                           
 200 In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, No. 11-cv-1016 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2014) (order 
extending stay of Ohio executions until January 15, 2015); In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 
No. 11-cv-1016 (S.D. Ohio May 27, 2014) (order staying Ohio executions until August 15, 2014).  
 201 See Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp. 2d 872, 880 (M.D. Tenn. 2007); Taylor, 2006 WL 
1779035, at *2–6; Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1043–46 (N.D. Cal. 2006).  
 202 See, e.g., Bowersox, No. 14-1403, slip op. at 2 (Bye, J., dissenting); see also Della Hasselle, 
State Must Reveal Details of Death-Penalty Practices, Federal Magistrate Rules, LENS (June 5, 
2013), http://thelensnola.org/2013/06/05/state-must-reveal-details-of-death-penalty-practices-federal-
judge-rules/#, archived at http://perma.cc/YR2Q-PV5Y. 
 203 See Bowersox, No. 14-1403, slip op. at 2. 
 204 See id. 
 205 Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1072 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
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B contends that inmates possess a due process right to this information. Sec-
tion C explains that the states’ interests do not justify withholding the infor-
mation. Section D summarizes the due process remedy. Finally, Section E con-
siders and rejects potential counter-arguments.  
A. The Right to Discovery Under the Federal Rules 
As an initial matter, it is not clear that a death row inmate should even 
need to resort to a due process argument to obtain information about the state’s 
execution procedure. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for broad discovery,206 permitting civil litigants to obtain from their 
adversaries “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense . . . . Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the dis-
covery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”207 Broad discovery, indeed, is essential to a well-functioning adver-
sarial litigation system. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Hickman v. 
Taylor, “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties 
is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other 
to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.”208 
There is no question that information about a challenged lethal injection 
procedure is relevant to an inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim.209 As the trial 
court found when it granted discovery over Pennsylvania’s objection in Ches-
ter v. Beard, “understanding and evaluating the drugs used in a lethal injection 
protocol is an integral part of this constitutional analysis.”210 Indeed, as that 
court held, such information “lies at the heart of the Eighth Amendment analy-
sis.”211 Moreover, as discussed below, the burden imposed on the states by dis-
covery is very modest.212 In light of this minimal burden and the importance of 
the discovery to the plaintiff’s case, any judicial balancing should clearly 
weigh in favor of discovery.213 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE CIVIL § 2008 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that admissibility at trial is not the 
limit of discovery and that discovery of inadmissible matter may be had). 
 207 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 208 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
 209 See supra notes 48–140; infra notes 457–485 and accompanying text. 
 210 No. 1:08-CV-1261, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2012). 
 211 Id. 
 212 See infra notes 356–419 and accompanying text. 
 213 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (“[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discov-
ery otherwise allowed by these rules . . . if it determines that . . . the burden or expense of the pro-
posed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in contro-
versy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of 
the discovery in resolving the issues.”); Chester, 2012 WL 5386129, at *5. 
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States might nevertheless point out that Rule 26’s broad ambit only ap-
plies to “nonprivileged matter.”214 They therefore might object that their own 
laws privilege information pertaining to execution procedures, thereby shield-
ing that information from ordinary discovery.215 This argument, however, is 
unavailing, because Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes clear 
that federal common law, not state law, governs claims of privilege in federal 
question cases.216 For example, the federal common law of privilege overrides 
state press shield laws in federal question cases.217 
The question, nonetheless, remains whether federal courts applying the 
federal common law of privilege should find that the federal common law 
merely tracks the relevant state statute.218 They should not. First, in some 
states, the statutes concealing lethal injection procedures are not technically 
“privileges” but rather provisions treating the information as “confidential” or 
exempt from disclosure under state FOIA provisions.219 It is therefore not clear 
that these materials should be treated as “privileged” under Rule 501.220 
More importantly, even where state legislation does create a “privilege” 
for some or all of the relevant material,221 that fact is hardly decisive in deter-
                                                                                                                           
 214 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 215 The precise meaning of the term “privilege” is a knotty one. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
& KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 5423 (1st ed. 1980) 
(“Congress gave little indication of the meaning it attributed to the word “privilege.”). 
 216 See FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 also stipulates that “in a civil case, state law governs privi-
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does not apply to Eighth Amendment lethal injection challenges because the claim plainly arises under 
federal law and no state law can override the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This 
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 217 See Zinna v. Brd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 250 F.R.D. 527, 529 (D. Colo. 2007); Theodore Cam-
pagnolo, The Conflict Between State Press Shield Laws and Federal Criminal Proceedings: The Rule 
501 Blues, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 445, 448 (2003) (explaining that state press shield laws “provide no 
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privilege applies). 
 218 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 215, § 5324 n.34 (suggesting that the federal common 
law may sometimes follow state law when the state privilege concerns secrets of state government). 
 219 See, e.g., ARK. CODE § 5-4-617(g) (2013) (“The procedures [regarding lethal injection and its 
implementation] . . . are not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act of 1967.”); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-31.2 (2013) (classifying as “confidential” the “name, address, quali-
fications, and other identifying information relating to the identity of any person or entity supplying or 
administering the intravenous injection substance or substances” and treating disclosure of such in-
formation as a misdemeanor); TENN. CODE § 10-7-504(h)(1) (2014) (treating records identifying indi-
viduals or entities “directly involved in the process executing a sentence of death” as “confidential” 
and stating that they “shall not be open to public inspection”). 
 220 Admittedly, the fact that a state has or has not labeled something a “privilege” is relevant but 
not decisive to the inquiry. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 215, § 5423. 
 221 See, e.g., GA. CODE § 42-5-36(b)–(c) (classifying materials as “confidential state secrets and 
privileged under law”); OKLA. STAT. § 22-17-1015(B) (2011) (“The identity of all persons who par-
ticipate in or administer the execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical supplies or 
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mining the content of federal common law, especially given the weighty feder-
al constitutional concerns favoring broad discovery.222 While federal courts do 
sometimes consider state privilege law a factor in determining whether an as-
serted privilege applies under federal common law,223 they also recognize the 
need to safeguard federal interests from interference by state privileges.224 
Those federal interests are particularly strong in civil rights cases where in-
mates assert violations of their federal constitutional rights; where the infor-
mation sought is crucial to the plaintiff’s case; where the state entirely controls 
the information in question; and where the inmate also has a strong due pro-
cess argument in favor of discovery.225 Indeed, the broad discovery favored in 
federal litigation is especially important in civil rights actions, which “should 
be resolved by a determination of the truth rather than a determination that the 
truth shall remain hidden.”226 For these reasons, the court in Chester rejected 
Pennsylvania’s assertion of a privilege, emphasizing that the state’s infor-
mation about its lethal drugs “is not available through other discovery from 
other sources, and the information is important to the adjudication of the issues 
raised in this case.”227 
Moreover, even if the state’s asserted privilege were relevant to the con-
tent of the federal common law of privilege, inmates’ due process rights should 
trump that privilege.228 It would be passing strange for federal common law to 
                                                                                                                           
medical equipment for the execution shall be confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any 
civil or criminal proceedings.”). 
 222 See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 357–58 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that eviden-
tiary privileges are generally not favored because they interfere with the search for truth). 
 223 See, e.g., Awalt v. Marketti, 287 F.R.D. 409, 416 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Clemmer v. Office of Chief 
Judge, 544 F. Supp. 2d 722, 725 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 224 See Gargiulo v. Baystate Health Inc., 279 F.R.D. 62, 64 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that federal 
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F.R.D. 245, 279 (1982) (noting that some kinds of civil rights cases “may be seen as involving consti-
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injury or commercial cases might not). 
 226 Inmates of Unit 14 v. Rebideau, 102 F.R.D. 122, 128 (N.D. NY 1984); see also Steinberg v. 
Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 12 CIV. 51 SLT VMS, 2014 WL 1311572, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2014); Milburn v. City of York, No. 1:12-CV-0121, 2013 WL 3049108, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 
2013); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Wood v. Breier, 54 F.R.D. 7, 11 (E.D. 
Wis. 1972). 
 227 2012 WL 5386129, at *6. 
 228 In cases litigated shortly before an execution date, the fact that the inmate has not only a right 
to discovery but also a due process right to information should help militate in favor of a stay of exe-
cution. The case for a stay is especially strong where the state itself bears some responsibility for the 
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vitiate the underlying Eighth Amendment right, especially when doing so 
would also violate core due process principles entitling the inmate to discov-
ery.229 Moreover, to the extent that states have a strong interest in keeping 
some material secret, such as the identities of execution team members, courts 
can grant the inmate access to relevant information about the execution proce-
dure’s safety while simultaneously protecting those interests.230 Therefore, 
courts construing the federal common law of privilege should hold that state 
lethal injection procedures are not privileged (with the possible exception of 
the identity of execution team members and pharmacies providing the 
drugs).231 And because this information is not privileged, lethal injection plain-
tiffs are entitled to it as part of the normal course of discovery.232 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that courts in other settings routinely 
permit robust discovery into prison operations. Prison inmates bringing Eighth 
Amendment claims challenging prison conditions, for instance, often get a 
broad range of discovery, including documents, depositions, expert reports, 
and more.233 This discovery into prison conditions and practices is, in fact, far 
more intrusive and fact-intensive than the materials pertaining to lethal injec-
tion.234 For example, discovery in Brown v. Plata included, inter alia, an expert 
report based on eight tours of California prisons, reports and ongoing monitor-
ing from special masters, and extensive testimony from the parties.235 The 
fruits of this discovery included extensive details about “understaffing, inade-
quate facilities, and unsanitary and unsafe living conditions.”236 
                                                                                                                           
need for the stay, such as when it alters its execution procedure at the last minute or refuses to comply 
with plaintiffs’ timely requests for information. See infra 394–407 and accompanying text. 
 229 See infra notes 240–355 and accompanying text. 
 230 See infra notes 357–367 and accompanying text. 
 231 See infra notes 357–393 and accompanying text. 
 232 Because courts often do not grant lethal injection plaintiffs discovery into this material, the 
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 233 See BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED REFORM 
OF TEXAS PRISONS 124 (1989) (detailing the lengthy discovery process in the prison conditions case 
Ruiz v. Estelle, in which the trial court enjoined prison officials from harassing plaintiff inmates); 
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 234 See Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 
319, 398–99 (1997) (contrasting courts’ relative “neglect” of method-of-execution claims with their 
more careful consideration of prison conditions cases). 
 235 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1935 (2011). 
 236 Id. 
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Such discovery is obviously intrusive, but courts permit it nonetheless, 
because it is essential to the asserted Eighth Amendment claim.237 Lethal injec-
tion plaintiffs seek materials that are just as essential and far less extensive. 
Discovery into prison conditions can encompass far-ranging inquiries into the 
daily administration of prisons, potentially impacting prison security and state 
budgets.238 By contrast, lethal injection plaintiffs only seek discovery into ma-
terials related to one procedure that has nothing to do with the ordinary day-to-
day operations of the prison. Additionally, whereas prison condition litigation 
examines issues over which prison officials ostensibly enjoy expertise, such as 
prison safety and security, lethal injection litigation explores a complicated, 
quasi-medical procedure that most prison officials do not understand.239 Fur-
thermore, executions cannot be undone, so when courts ignore inmates’ con-
cerns, the resulting harm is irreparable. If anything, then, courts should be 
more, not less, inclined to grant a lethal injection plaintiff’s discovery request. 
B. The Inmate’s Due Process Right to Information 
This Section explores the due process right to information. Sub-section 1 
examines core due process and fairness principles. Sub-section 2 explains why 
courts, rather than administrative agencies, must protect inmates’ Eighth 
Amendment rights against excruciating executions. Sub-section 3 argues that 
even if some courts are reluctant to find an independent, Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process right to information, they still should find such a right to in-
formation under the due process component of the Eighth Amendment. 
1. Due Process, Basic Fairness, and the Right to Information  
The Eighth Amendment creates a right against cruel and unusual punish-
ment,240 and Baze v. Rees indicates that execution procedures that create a sub-
stantial risk of serious pain violate that right.241 Without information about an 
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execution procedure’s details, courts simply cannot assess the degree of risk. 
To this extent, courts’ refusal to force states to disclose key details of their exe-
cution procedures effectively strips the condemned of their Eighth Amendment 
protections.242 
Due process clearly covers inmates challenging their method of execu-
tion. The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly that individu-
als “condemned to suffer grievous loss” enjoy due process protections.243 The 
question of whether an individual is condemned to “grievous loss” depends 
both on the “weight” of the individual’s interest and “whether the nature of the 
interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”244 By any measure, an inmate’s Eighth Amend-
ment right protecting him against an excruciating execution is “weighty.”245 
And whether one conceives of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right against an 
excruciating execution as a liberty interest or a “residual life interest,”246 that 
interest is plainly within the Fourteenth Amendment’s contemplation.247 
Due process requires that the government give affected parties both notice 
of its plans and an opportunity to be heard.248 The Court has likewise recog-
nized that the state must provide this notice and a hearing “‘at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.’”249 Notice, thus, must “permit adequate 
preparation for . . . an impending hearing,”250 during which the inmate must 
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ing text. 
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have “an opportunity to present [his] objections.”251 Without such procedures, 
a legal system can hardly be said to be fair or just. As the Court itself once 
stated, “procedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of 
Rights not as abstract rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness 
and justice before any person could be deprived of ‘life, liberty, or proper-
ty.’”252 
The due process requirement that government must afford individuals 
meaningful hearings is not limited to criminal trials but extends after a convic-
tion. For example, in Morrissey v. Brewer,253 the Supreme Court held that due 
process requires that the state provide a hearing for paroled prisoners before 
revoking their parole.254 Due process takes on still additional weight in the 
death penalty context. In Ford v. Wainwright, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on executing the insane required states to provide 
capital inmates adequate procedures to demonstrate their insanity.255 In so 
holding, the Court emphasized “the heightened concern for fairness and accu-
racy that has characterized our review of the process requisite to the taking of a 
human life.”256  
To ensure this meaningful hearing, due process sometimes requires that 
the state grant both the aggrieved individual and the tribunal access to im-
portant information. For instance, in Morgan v. Illinois, the Supreme Court 
held that in order to protect the criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury,257 the trial court must permit the defendant an opportunity to 
conduct adequate voir dire to gather sufficient information to make challenges 
to potential jurors.258 Specifically, the Court found that the defense had a con-
stitutional right to ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote 
for the death penalty in every case.259 As the Court put it, “[w]ere voir dire not 
available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner’s challenge for cause against 
those prospective jurors who would always impose death following conviction, 
his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory.”260 Mor-
gan, thus, emphasized that due process requires not merely some procedures, 
                                                                                                                           
 251 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
 252 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCan, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942). 
 253 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972). 
 254 See id. at 481–82.  
 255 477 U.S. 399, 402, 417–18 (1986). 
 256 Id. at 414; see Moore v. Illinois 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (holding that defendants have a right 
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 257 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 258 See 504 U.S. 719, 728–29 (1992). 
 259 See id.  
 260 Id. at 733.  
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but meaningful ones that afford individuals the information needed to protect 
other constitutional rights.  
These due process principles are not just matters of individual rights but 
are also an important component of a healthy democracy. The “heart of the 
matter,” as Justice Frankfurter once wrote, “is that democracy implies respect 
for the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy; a democratic 
government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can rarely be ob-
tained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights.”261 Our 
country relies on an adversarial legal system that presumes that “[n]o better 
instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeop-
ardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet 
it.”262 By denying inmates notice of the procedures by which they will be exe-
cuted and a fair hearing to challenge those procedures, courts effectively block 
inmates’ access to any forum that could protect their asserted rights, thereby 
undermining core principles of our adversarial legal system. 
Indeed, when a court rejects an inmate’s request for information about the 
state’s planned execution procedure, it denies itself the opportunity to make an 
informed judgment about the procedure’s safety. In various contexts, the Court 
has explained that the state must disclose information not only to aid the re-
questing party but also the tribunal itself. For example, when the Court in Ford 
held that the states must provide capital inmates adequate procedures to 
demonstrate their insanity, it emphasized the tribunal’s need for full infor-
mation.263 The panel, the Court insisted, must “have before it all possible rele-
vant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must deter-
mine.”264 Without the inmate’s participation, “the factfinder loses the substan-
tial benefit of potentially probative information. The result is a much greater 
likelihood of an erroneous decision.”265  
Similarly, in 1963, in the seminal case Brady v. Maryland, the Court held 
that due process requires the government to provide to the criminal defendant 
evidence that “would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty,”266 and to do 
so in sufficient time to permit the defendant to make effective use of the evi-
dence at trial.267 As in Ford, the Court emphasized not just the individual’s 
interest in a fair proceeding, but also courts’ need for a thorough record. The 
                                                                                                                           
 261 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 170–72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Fuentes, 407 U.S at 81. 
 262 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 170 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 263 Ford, 477 U.S. at 417–18. 
 264 Id. at 413.  
 265 Id. at 414.  
 266 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
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integrity of the judicial system, Brady explained, requires courts to proceed 
with full information.268 Moreover, subsequent cases have clarified that courts 
should fashion procedures to ensure that they have the information to resolve 
cases fairly and accurately. For instance, where disclosure allegedly involves 
confidential state information, due process requires the trial court to review 
confidential state information in camera to determine whether the state with-
held material that may have assisted the defense.269 When the trial court finds 
such material, it must order a new trial.270 
Though these precedents establish that due process principles encompass 
a right to information needed to assure meaningful proceedings, courts may 
nevertheless worry about intruding too much on state prerogatives. Due pro-
cess analysis, after all, must weigh the individual’s interests against the state’s 
interests. In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court announced a balancing test for de-
termining which procedures the government owes to individuals deprived of 
life, liberty, or property.271 Mathews weighed three factors: the private interest 
affected by the official action, the risk of erroneous deprivation through exist-
ing procedures, and the government’s interest in retaining the status quo.272 
Although Mathews involved the administrative procedures required before the 
termination of disability payments,273 the Supreme Court also uses it to resolve 
“the tension that often exists between the autonomy that the Government as-
serts is necessary in order to pursue effectively a particular goal and the pro-
cess that a citizen contends he is due before he is deprived of a constitutional 
right.”274 
Viewed through the lens of the Mathews factors, the inmate’s right to dis-
closure is usually strong.275 The inmate’s private interest against a painful exe-
cution is not a mere statutory entitlement, but a constitutional right. Individual 
rights are the most precious private interests.276 The right to be free from an 
                                                                                                                           
 268 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
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 269 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58–60 (1987) (requiring that confidential infor-
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 270 See id.  
 271 See 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
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 273 See 424 U.S. at 323. 
 274 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–29. 
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. . . is almost uniquely compelling”). 
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excruciating death therefore weighs heavily in the individual’s favor.277 More-
over, because death is final, the injury inflicted on the individual is irreparable, 
thus further adding to the weight of the individual’s interest.278  
The second Mathews factor—existing procedural safeguards—also mili-
tates in favor of disclosure. Without the opportunity to review the protocol’s 
key facts and challenge them in court, an inmate receives no meaningful pro-
cess about the method of his execution. To be sure, many states permit access 
to some information about their execution protocols, but they typically with-
hold the information that speaks most directly to the risk of pain. They similar-
ly often withhold recent changes to the procedure. The denial of information, 
thus, substantially heightens the risk of an Eighth Amendment violation, be-
cause the execution procedure’s most important details entirely escape judicial 
review. Moreover, although the risk of pain will differ from case to case, that 
risk may well increase if states know they can keep their execution procedures 
secret indefinitely.279 
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, under the third Mathews factor, 
the government’s interests against disclosure are usually modest.280 Indeed, the 
government has no interest in using an unconstitutional execution proce-
dure.281 Of course, states assert an interest in preserving the death penalty and 
worry that the disclosure of their drug providers’ identities will result in anti-
death penalty activists pressuring pharmacies to stop providing chemicals for 
executions.282 States may further contend that disclosing information about the 
execution team will subject team members to harassment and public ridi-
cule.283 However understandable, these concerns underestimate courts’ ability 
                                                                                                                           
 277 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 66 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Finally, given the real risk of error in this 
class of cases, the irrevocable nature of the consequences is of decisive importance to me.”). 
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to craft remedies that accommodate the inmates’ right to information without 
threatening these state interests.284 For example, as discussed below, courts can 
order neutral testing of the states’ drugs to assure chemical purity and potency 
without compromising the anonymity of the providing compounding pharma-
cy.285 Courts can also craft protective orders that grant inmates the information 
they need to evaluate the safety of execution procedures, such as the qualifica-
tions of execution team members, while simultaneously guarding against dis-
closure of sensitive information, such as the identity of the team members.286 
States also argue that vindicating the right to information will delay exe-
cutions and obstruct the timely administration of justice.287 In some cases, this 
argument may be legally persuasive in theory, because the burden for obtaining 
a stay of execution is high.288 Nevertheless, in practice, this argument often 
obscures the extent to which the state itself bears the responsibility for that 
delay, either because it changed its procedure shortly before a scheduled exe-
cution or because it has denied an inmate’s timely request for details about the 
procedure.289 The Mathews test, then, usually weighs strongly in favor of dis-
closure.290 
This outcome may be unpopular with some people, but the state’s inter-
ests in these cases, quite simply, do not excuse the denial of fair hearings. As 
one dissenting judge put it: 
[M]any people believe that there should be no appeals whatsoever fol-
lowing the jury’s imposition of the death sentence. The law, on the 
other hand, provides that certain procedures must be followed before 
a death sentence may be carried out. Although it may not win a popu-
                                                                                                                           
 284 Cf. First Amendment Coal. v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868 at 884 (weighing “strongly” the fact 
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larity contest in any given case, this scheme was adopted to ensure 
that every individual would be accorded due process of law.291 
2. The Importance of a Judicial Determination of the Right 
It is important to emphasize that due process in this context requires a ju-
dicial adjudication of the Eighth Amendment right. The protection of constitu-
tional rights is a quintessential judicial function. Although some judges, to 
their credit, have recognized their constitutional duty to examine closely exe-
cution procedures before them,292 many courts have abdicated their oversight 
of these constitutional matters to the very administrative agents whose proce-
dures they should be reviewing.293 Courts, in other words, often give depart-
ments of corrections the benefit of the doubt, assuming without any study that 
their execution procedures pass constitutional muster.294 
Such reflexive hyper-deference to departments of correction is wholly in-
appropriate.295 Most correctional departments have developed lethal injection 
protocols haphazardly and without oversight, transparency, or expertise.296 As 
Justice Stevens pointed out in Baze, states usually operate “with no specialized 
medical knowledge and without the benefit of expert assistance or guid-
ance.”297 Given that technical expertise is usually one of the primary justifica-
tions for delegating matters to administrative agencies,298 the agencies’ lack of 
expertise in lethal injection highlights the need for external review of their ac-
tions.299 
Correctional officials also have a strong, self-interested reason to consider 
their own procedures legitimate. Although state statutes sometimes indicate the 
kinds of drugs to be used,300 often correctional departments must make these 
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choices themselves,301 and, even where they do not, they typically design and 
implement the procedures’ details.302 Even the most fair-minded correctional 
officials may believe in the viability of procedures designed by respected col-
leagues.303 Blind deference to such administrative action defies common sense, 
especially when constitutional rights are at stake.304 As Justice Frankfurter 
once observed, administrative agents should not be trusted as impartial arbiters 
of their own policies.305 Indeed, the whole theory behind the Bill of Rights as-
sumes that “people cannot safely be trusted with complete immunity from 
outward responsibility in depriving others of their rights.”306 
Basic institutional analysis further highlights the dangers of leaving con-
stitutional questions solely in the hands of administrative agencies. While 
many people of good faith work for correctional departments, their mandate in 
this area is to kill the condemned with apparently unproblematic execution 
protocols that comply with the broad parameters set by the legislature. Correc-
tional departments’ primary obligation in this area, then, is not to protect 
Eighth Amendment rights, but to create affordable, workable execution proce-
dures that do not appear to cause suffering. Many states’ continued use of the 
paralytic, pancuronium bromide, demonstrates their paramount interest in an 
execution procedure that appears peaceful.307 Thus, like other administrative 
agents, correctional officials are prone to tunnel vision, focusing on their insti-
tutional goal (executing inmates) at the possible expense of constitutional val-
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ues.308 Indeed, if anything, correctional departments may be especially prone 
to such constitutional neglect, given that they are often exempted from ordi-
nary administrative accountability mechanisms, like state Administrative Pro-
cedure Acts and Freedom of Information Acts.309 
In light of this agency tunnel vision, courts should recognize that they are 
better situated than correctional departments to determine the constitutionality 
of execution procedures.310 Article III of the U.S. Constitution, after all, insu-
lates judges from direct political pressures, thereby encouraging impartial de-
cision-making.311 Additionally, judicial processes are designed to permit ad-
versaries to present their facts and arguments so as to expose the decision-
maker to both sides of a case. The theory, of course, is that courts, unlike some 
other governmental entities, will be better situated to neutrally apply law (in-
cluding constitutional law) to the facts. The judiciary’s basic structures, there-
fore, encourage judges to consider constitutional principles more carefully than 
other governmental officials do, allowing courts to take the “long view” of is-
sues, rather than caving to immediate political pressures.312 
Relatedly, unlike administrative agencies, which typically have narrow 
statutory mandates, courts have broader societal commitments to the rule of 
law and the Constitution. Whereas agencies can often be fairly accused of tun-
nel vision, “[c]ourts . . . do not suffer congenitally from this myopia; their gen-
eral jurisdiction gives them a broad perspective which no agency can have.”313 
As Alexander Bickel put it:  
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Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insula-
tion to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of gov-
ernment. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a socie-
ty, and it is not something that institutions can do well occasionally, 
while operating for the most part with a different set of gears.314  
Even if this institutional comparison may be contestable in particular instances, 
in the death penalty context, states’ efforts to procure lethal drugs from any 
willing source strongly suggest that they care less about Eighth Amendment 
values than about carrying out executions.315 
The Supreme Court in other contexts has recognized the dangers of en-
trusting individual rights to administrative agents without sufficient judicial 
review. In Ford, the Court faulted Florida for vesting the executive branch with 
sole authority to determine whether inmates were sane enough to execute.316 
As the Court emphasized, “[i]n no other circumstance . . . is the vindication of 
a constitutional right entrusted to the unreviewable discretion of an administra-
tive tribunal.”317 
This principle extends well beyond the Eighth Amendment context. In 
1965, in Freedman v. Maryland,318 for instance, the Court considered a Mary-
land statute that required movie theaters to submit films they wished to show 
to the State Board of Censors prior to screening.319 The Court unanimously 
invalidated Maryland’s censorship scheme that had vested unfettered discre-
tion in the State Board. In particular, the Court emphasized that the State’s ad-
ministrative system, without meaningful judicial review, was inadequate to 
protecting free speech. “[B]ecause only a judicial determination in an adver-
sary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression,” 
wrote the Court, “only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices 
to impose a valid final restraint.”320  
Along similar lines, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 
the Court struck down the affirmative action program of the Medical School of 
the University of California at Davis, in part because, “isolated segments of 
our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions 
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[about affirmative action], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and 
legislatively determined criteria.”321 And in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the 
Court invalidated Civil Service Commission regulations forbidding the em-
ployment of legal resident aliens. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the 
Commission, which had acted without Congressional or Presidential instruc-
tions, lacked the democratic pedigree to take steps that raised serious equal 
protection and due process questions.322 Of course, much more could be said 
about these cases, but collectively they help establish that courts should not 
relinquish to administrative agencies their duty to safeguard individual rights. 
In part because non-judicial adjudicative hearings are sometimes inade-
quate, due process encompasses a constitutional right of access to courts—a 
right the Supreme Court previously held must be “adequate, effective, and 
meaningful.”323 This right extends beyond the mere theoretical option of bring-
ing a lawsuit and encompasses certain kinds of affirmative assistance that pris-
oners may need to help ensure a fair day in court.324 This right, thus, advances 
the general and broad due process notion that the aggrieved have “a reasonably 
adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitu-
tional rights to the courts.”325 
In keeping with these precedents, it should be clear that a judicial deter-
mination is essential to protecting inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.326 
Meaningful judicial review, however, can only occur if the court has access to 
all relevant details of the execution procedure. Without such information, 
courts rule on constitutional claims about which they know very little. Thus, 
given the nature of our adversarial legal system, judicial consideration of lethal 
injection procedures necessarily requires that inmates be permitted to study the 
procedures’ details in advance so that they can present the dangers in court.327 
Presumably, in some instances, the procedure will present no meaningful risk 
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of pain, but unless a court has already upheld the same procedure the state 
plans to use, it cannot take the safety of an execution procedure for granted. 
On the contrary, given the history of botched executions,328 courts should rec-
ognize that lethal injection creates serious risks requiring careful judicial study 
of states’ specific plans.  
3. The Due Process Component of the Eighth Amendment 
Although inmates have a strong due process argument in favor of receiv-
ing relevant information about states’ lethal injection procedures, many lower 
courts implicitly reject the existence of an independent due process right to this 
information.329 These courts instead tether the right to disclosure to the Eighth 
Amendment claim, finding that flaws within the Eighth Amendment claim 
necessarily defeat the inmate’s right to information. For example, in 2014, in 
In re Lombardi, the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, permitted the State to with-
hold its execution protocol details, because the inmates failed to assert a viable 
Eighth Amendment claim.330 Specifically, the Eight Circuit faulted the inmates 
for failing to satisfy Baze’s requirement that they proffer an alternative method 
of execution.331 Because the underlying Eighth Amendment claim failed, the 
court held that the inmates were not entitled to discovery about the State’s exe-
cution procedures.332 Though the Eighth Circuit did not explicitly state that any 
asserted right to disclosure could only exist as a component of the Eighth 
Amendment right, its analysis suggested that conclusion and did not contem-
plate the possibility of a free-floating due process right.  
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit in Whitaker v. Livingston reasoned similarly, 
writing, “plaintiffs’ access-to-the-courts argument still hinges on their ability to 
show a potential Eighth Amendment violation. One is not entitled to access to 
the courts merely to argue that there might be some remote possibility of some 
constitutional violation.”333 Other courts rejecting death row inmates’ asserted 
due process right to information seem to follow this line of reasoning, albeit 
somewhat obscurely.334 
                                                                                                                           
 328 See Berger, supra note 22, at 263–73; Denno, supra note 17, at 1339–45; supra notes 117–138 
and accompanying text. 
 329 See supra notes 176–205 and accompanying text. 
 330 741 F.3d 888, 895–96 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 331 See id. 
 332 See id. at 896. 
 333 Whitaker, 732 F3d at 467. 
 334 See, e.g., Sepulvado, 729 F.3d at 418–19 (distinguishing Arthur v. Thomas, 674 F.3d 1257, 
1263–64 (11th Cir. 2012), on the grounds that Arthur grounded its decision in the Eighth Amendment, 
but refrained from reaching the due process question); Powell v. Thomas, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 
1282–83 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (rejecting the proposition that a condemned inmate had an independent due 
process right to receive notice and a hearing regarding a substitution of drugs in a lethal injection 
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Courts in these cases undervalued important due process principles exam-
ined above.335 Indeed, it seems backwards to treat the Eighth Amendment 
claim as antecedent to the due process right to information, because the state’s 
secrecy makes it impossible for the plaintiff to mount a viable challenge to its 
execution procedure. That said, plaintiffs seeking this information must recog-
nize that they face sizable obstacles. Whether correctly or not, some courts 
apparently see the due process right as a component of the Eighth Amendment 
right, not as a free-floating claim. Moreover, the Supreme Court in District 
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne viewed skeptically an asserted independent due 
process right to information, albeit in a different context.336 Foundational due 
process principles clearly point towards a right to information here, but, in 
practice, courts may resist such a right.  
In light of these difficulties, inmates seeking this information ought to as-
sert not only an independent Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim,337 but also an Eighth Amendment due process claim. While both claims 
rely on the same notions of due process and fairness, courts seem to worry that 
a free-standing due process right to information is limitless and therefore too 
burdensome on the government. By contrast, when framed as a due process 
component of the Eighth Amendment, the right to information is tethered 
closely to the assertion of a substantive constitutional right. So framed, the due 
process right seems more essential, given that the information in question is 
necessary to protect another constitutional liberty. Furthermore, the right to 
information under this view is more easily cabined. Inmates would receive all 
information bearing on the execution procedure’s risk of substantial pain, but 
not information unconnected to that Eighth Amendment inquiry. In light of 
these factors, the due process component of the Eighth Amendment is probably 
                                                                                                                           
procedure); see also Arthur, 674 F.3d at 1263–64 (deciding the death row issue based on the Eighth 
Amendment, while refusing to address the due process question). 
 335 See supra notes 240–328 and accompanying text. 
 336 557 U.S. 52, 67–75 (2009) (rejecting prison inmate’s § 1983 claim asserting a due process 
right to DNA evidence to establish his innocence). 
 337 If courts approach this question as an independent due process question, the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause would apply in actions against state governments, whereas the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause would apply against the federal government. See Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies 
to states in the same way that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to the federal gov-
ernment). Substantively, the nature of the two inquiries would be the same. See id.; see also Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). But see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due 
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 495–500 (2010) (arguing that the meaning of the term “due pro-
cess” encompassed procedural due process when the Fifth Amendment was ratified in 1791 but ex-
panded to include some substantive content by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
1868). 
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more likely to resonate with more courts than an independent due process right 
to information.  
The U.S. Supreme Court in other contexts has already recognized a due 
process component of other constitutional rights. For example, as discussed 
above, Morgan v. Illinois held that trial courts must allow criminal defendants 
to ask potential jurors during voir dire whether they would automatically vote 
for the death penalty.338 Such information, the Court reasoned, was necessary 
to allow the criminal defendant to protect his Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury.339 Significantly, Morgan emphasized that this right to infor-
mation about potential jurors’ views arose not from the Sixth Amendment 
alone, but also from “the requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”340  
Similarly, as Henry Monaghan has demonstrated, the Court recognized a 
set of hybrid procedural rights in a series of free speech licensing cases. For 
example, in cases like Freedman and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, the 
Court fashioned a series of “procedural safeguards designed to obviate the 
dangers of a censorship system” threatening free speech.341 Far from being 
anomalous, then, the right to information through the due process component 
of the Eighth Amendment fits with a long-established judicial practice of rec-
ognizing procedural rights needed to protect other substantive rights.  
When inmates do assert the right to information through the due process 
component of the Eighth Amendment, they must be sure to allege a viable 
Eighth Amendment claim.342 Consequently, an inmate’s complaint should, fol-
lowing Baze, assert that the challenged procedure creates a substantial risk of 
serious harm.343 In many cases, inmates know which kinds of drugs the state 
plans to use,344 so the complaint can simply allege the risks associated with 
those drugs. If the state plans to use compounded pentobarbital, for instance, 
the inmate can explain the dangers that the drug will be impure, tainted, or 
otherwise flawed and therefore painful.345 He can similarly point to the 
                                                                                                                           
 338 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729–30; see supra notes 257–260 and accompanying text. 
 339 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 
 340 Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729.  
 341 Monaghan, supra note 308, at 518 (quoting Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58); see Shuttlesworth, 394 
U.S. at 150; David S. Bogen, First Amendment Ancillary Doctrines, 37 MD. L. REV. 679, 687 (1978). 
 342 In extreme cases where the state has provided absolutely no information about its intended 
execution procedure, the inmate’s independent due process claim would be very strong, because the 
state would have intentionally deprived the inmate of his right to know anything about the method of 
execution. As discussed above, however, usually the states provide the inmate with some information 
to allege dangers associated with particular types of lethal injection procedures. See supra notes 163– 
172 and accompanying text. 
 343 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
 344 See supra notes 7–12, 163–166 and accompanying text. 
 345 See supra notes 103–116 and accompanying text. 
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botched executions of Eric Robert and Michael Lee Wilson as examples of 
compounded pentobarbital’s dangers.346 Alternatively, if the state still uses a 
three-drug protocol, the inmate can explain the grave risks of excruciating pain 
if the first drug does not render the inmate unconscious.347 He can also identi-
fy, inter alia, the botched three-drug executions of Clayton Lockett and Angel 
Diaz.348 In all events, the gravamen of the complaint would be that the drugs 
selected create certain risks of pain, and that the constitutionality of the proce-
dure therefore hinges on the particulars of the state’s drugs and procedures, 
which the state must allow the plaintiff to inspect. 
In addition to alleging a substantial risk of serious harm, inmate plaintiffs 
should proffer a “feasible, readily implemented” alternative method of execu-
tion.349 Although there remains disagreement as to whether Baze in fact does 
require such a proffer,350 enough lower courts have read Baze to do so that the 
safe route would be to assume that it does.351 Of course, there is a perversity in 
requiring plaintiffs to propose an alternative to a procedure about which they 
have no detailed information. That said, in many instances, the inmate knows 
enough to make a reasonable proffer. For example, if the plaintiff knows the 
state plans to use compounded pentobarbital, he could proffer that the state’s 
drug be subjected to neutral chemical testing to check for flaws.352 In that case, 
a chemical test would either vindicate the state or raise serious concerns about 
the drug’s safety, thereby forcing the state to find a different drug that satisfied 
the chemical test.353  
Similarly, if the plaintiff knows that the state plans to use the three-drug 
protocol, he could proffer either that the state switch to a one-drug method us-
ing safe drugs verified by neutral chemical testing, or, alternatively, that the 
state take proper precautions to ensure that the inmate is fully anesthetized be-
fore the injection of the second and third drugs. Of course, some lawyers will 
be loath to suggest methods of execution that may be used to kill their clients. 
The realities of contemporary lethal injection litigation, however, make it very 
                                                                                                                           
 346 See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text. 
 347 See supra notes 50–65, 123–133 and accompanying text. 
 348 See supra notes 63–64, 126–133, 153–160; infra notes 464–469 and accompanying text.  
 349 Baze, 553 U.S. at 52. 
 350 See, e.g., In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d at 899 (Bye, J., dissenting); supra notes 78–81 and accom-
panying text. 
 351 See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 352 See infra notes 373–384 and accompanying text. 
 353 In this instance, the state could not reasonably assert that the proffered alternative was not 
sufficiently feasible. The state easily could return to the compounding pharmacy supplying the initial 
batch of drugs and explain that it needed unflawed compounded pentobarbital. Alternatively, the state 
could procure the proper drugs from a different pharmacy. 
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risky to decline to do so.354 Given that some courts link the right to information 
to the Eighth Amendment claim,355 failure to allege the Eighth Amendment 
violation in accordance with this reading of Baze could undermine the con-
nected right to disclosure and short-circuit the litigation before it gets going. 
C. The States’ Interests 
This Section examines the states’ ostensible interests in lethal injection 
secrecy. It concludes that states often overstate these interests and, even more 
importantly, that courts can amply protect these interests with carefully crafted 
procedures that grant the inmate access to important information without 
threatening the states’ core concerns. These arguments are relevant both to the 
third Mathews factor discussed above,356 and also to the more general, related 
issue of whether the states’ interests sufficiently justify their refusal to share 
important details about their execution procedures.  
1. Protecting Execution Team Anonymity 
One frequent state concern in these cases is that disclosure of information 
pertaining to an execution procedure will publicize the identities of execution 
team members. Execution teams may include doctors, nurses, paramedics, 
phlebotomists, as well as correctional officials and prison guards participating 
during the execution. Given recent attention to drug suppliers, this concern 
extends also to the pharmacists or providers who compound or supply drugs 
for the state. 
States’ interest in the anonymity of their execution teams is understanda-
ble, especially given that members of the execution team or providing pharma-
cies can be subject to harassment.357 Nevertheless, courts can and have pro-
                                                                                                                           
 354 See Ty Alper, The Truth About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 
N.C. L. REV. 11, 21 (2009) (“[L]awyers for death row inmates challenging states’ lethal injection 
procedures have generally argued that there are humane ways to execute prisoners, and they have 
routinely presented expert testimony to support this position.”). 
 355 See supra notes 330–334 and accompanying text. 
 356 See supra notes 271–290 and accompanying text. 
 357 See Brandi Grissom, TDCJ Refuses to Return Execution Drugs to Pharmacist, TEX. TRIB., Oct. 
7, 2013, https://www.texastribune.org/2013/10/07/tdcj-refuses-return-execution-drugs-pharmacist/, ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/8QB7-XWGD (describing hate mail compounding pharmacy received after it 
became public that it had provided drugs to Texas for use in executions); Ed Pilkington, Texas Accuses 
Anti-Death Penalty Charity Reprieve of Fomenting Violence, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 28, 2012, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/28/death-penalty-texas-reprieve, archived at http://perma.
cc/X9TL-V5TC (noting Texas’s accusations of “intimidation and harassment” of manufacturers’ whose 
drugs were used in lethal injection); Gary Grado, State Secret: Arizona Tries to Conceal Identity of Firm 
That Makes Chemical for Lethal Injections, ARIZ. CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, http://azcapitoltimes.
com/news/2013/10/14/state-secret-arizona-tries-to-conceal-identity-of-firm-that-makes-chemical-for-
lethal-injections/#ixzz3DtYNcwp7, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8DP-4Y3E (discussing compounding 
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tected these interests without denying inmates their Eighth Amendment due 
process rights. For example, courts can order that states disclose the details of 
their execution procedures while simultaneously permitting them to redact sen-
sitive information, such as the names of the execution team members.358 The 
court also can require that sensitive filings be made in camera or under seal 
without redaction.359 Alternatively, it can issue a protective order specifying 
the terms of disclosure so as to share information with the litigants but protect 
against the public dissemination of sensitive information.360 
In fashioning these discovery orders to protect the anonymity of execu-
tion team members and drug providers, courts must not deny inmates im-
portant information necessary to assess the constitutionality of the procedure. 
For example, while courts should protect the identities of execution team 
members, they should permit disclosure of the specific qualifications and train-
ing of these members, so inmates can assess whether they are capable of com-
petently fulfilling the tasks assigned to them.361 Though states typically argue 
that any discovery would necessarily publicize the identities of all execution 
team members, in reality courts are perfectly capable of striking sensible bal-
ances.362 Discovery, in short, need not be an all-or-nothing proposition. 
Courts have experience in a variety of settings striking this kind of bal-
ance, protecting the government’s interests while simultaneously granting the 
private litigants the materials they need.363 Indeed, some judges in lethal injec-
tion cases have already made use of these kinds of procedural devices. For ex-
ample, in 2006, a federal district court permitted an anonymous deposition of 
Missouri’s execution team leader, who sat behind a screen and did not share 
                                                                                                                           
pharmacies receiving threats and hate mail). But see Ellyde Roko, Executioner Identities: Toward Rec-
ognizing a Right to Know Who Is Hiding Beneath the Hood, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2823–29 (2007) 
(arguing that the public’s interest in knowing the executioner’s identity outweighs the reasons for con-
cealing identity). 
 358 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e) (giving the court discretion to require redaction of information in 
court filings). 
 359 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(d) (“The court may order that a filing be made under seal without 
redaction.”). 
 360 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“[T]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party 
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”). 
 361 See, e.g., Morales v. Hickman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 438 F.3d 
926 (9th Cir. 2006) (conditionally denying motion for preliminary injunction, indicating that state may 
share the qualifications of execution team members while redacting their “personal identifiers, except 
that the redacted information shall be provided to the Court for in camera review”). 
 362 See Berger, supra note 22, at 304. 
 363 See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1980); Afsheen 
John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
437, 438–39 (2010) (noting cases in which courts relied on “CIPA-style procedures to balance the 
values of secrecy and transparency”). 
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his name.364 While imperfect, such a mechanism permits the inmate’s lawyers 
to assess an execution team members’ competence while preserving his ano-
nymity.365 Courts have similarly permitted states to submit sensitive lethal in-
jection material for in camera review or fashioned protective orders prohibit-
ing the plaintiff from publicly disseminating sensitive information.366 The 
states’ argument that any discovery will necessarily compromise the anonymi-
ty of their execution teams is, in short, a canard.367 
2. Ensuring the Enduring Viability of Lethal Injection 
A related state concern is that continued judicial proceedings undermine 
the death penalty altogether. Anti-death penalty sentiment, both domestic and 
international, has limited states’ access to drugs used in lethal injections.368 
More specifically, pharmaceutical companies, hoping to avoid public relations 
problems, increasingly decide that they do not want their names associated 
with capital punishment and therefore do not want their products used in exe-
cutions. If states wish to continue lethal injection, they need to get drugs from 
other sources, such as compounding pharmacies. As the Apothecary Shoppe’s 
hasty settlement in Taylor indicates, however, some compounding pharmacies 
also may not want the bad publicity associated with executions.369 Were all 
potential drug suppliers to respond this way, states may be forced to abandon 
lethal injection altogether. States intent on continuing executions, then, believe 
                                                                                                                           
 364 See, e.g., Doe Deposition, supra note 62, at 1 (noting for the record that the deponent was 
behind a screen).  
 365 An enterprising reporter eventually revealed this doctor’s identity, but that might have hap-
pened anyway and, in any event, is not a sufficient justification for rejecting a legitimate constitutional 
claim. See Jeremy Kohler, Behind the Mask of the Mo. Execution Doctor, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
July 29, 2006, at A1. 
 366 See Moeller v. Weber, No. 04-4200, 2008 WL 1957842, at *4 (D. S.D. May 2, 2008) (allow-
ing State to submit sensitive materials for in camera review); Sells & Llanas v. Livingston, No. H-14-
832 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014) (order granting preliminary injunction) (requiring state to disclose under 
seal all information regarding procurement of drugs); Evans v. Saar, No. 06-149, (D. Md. Jan. 27, 
2006) (order granting protective order) (requiring disclosure of certain state lethal injection records, 
provided that plaintiff’s counsel not distribute such records to any third party and that plaintiff’s coun-
sel return all such records to State at conclusion of litigation); Taylor v. Crawford, No. 05-4173, 2006 
WL 1779035, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2005) (order granting protective order); Morales, 415 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1048; Berger, supra note 22, at 304. 
 367 Inmates, for their part, should not seek to learn the identities of execution team members. Such 
requests will likely accomplish little more than alienating the judge. 
 368 See Gibson & Lain, supra note 89, at 28–38. 
 369 The Apothecary Shoppe did not admit it had ever planned to supply drugs for executions, 
though it also did not deny it. See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Its Motion to Seal Documents, at 3, 
Taylor v. Apothecary Shoppe, No. 14-CV-063-TCK-TLW (N.D. Ok. Feb. 18, 2014). 
2014] Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process 1419 
they have a strong interest in keeping secret their compounding pharmacies, 
lest lawsuits and bad publicity scare them away, too.370 
Once again, the states’ argument underestimates courts’ ability to strike a 
sensible balance. As an initial matter, some death-penalty states are far less 
protective of medical providers’ anonymity in the abortion context, opening up 
abortion providers’ records to public inspection.371 Regardless of one’s views 
about abortion or capital punishment, this difference demonstrates that states 
do not consistently prioritize the anonymity of doctors and other people partic-
ipating in legal but highly controversial medical (or quasi-medical) proce-
dures.372 
Even taking for granted the validity of states’ concerns, however, they are 
overstated. Just as courts can fashion procedures to protect executioner identi-
ty, so too can they order impartial tests that would verify the chemical proper-
ties of the drugs without disclosing the identity of the supplying pharmacies.373 
States and inmates could even agree to such tests themselves without court 
order. If impartial, properly credentialed testers using scientifically validated 
testing methods determined that each of the state’s drugs was what it was sup-
posed to be (for example, 100% pentobarbital) and in its finished form was 
sterile, uncontaminated, and otherwise unflawed, the execution could proceed 
as scheduled (assuming no other serious problems with the procedure).374 If, 
however, the ingredients or drugs were deemed tainted, sub-potent, super-
potent, or otherwise flawed, the state could not proceed until it found safe al-
ternatives. 
                                                                                                                           
 370 See Editorial Board, Abbott Does an About-Face on Open Records, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, June 7, 2014, http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/abbotts-commitment-to-
open-government-questioned/ngF6Z/, archived at http://perma.cc/35R6-AJT6 (noting that a Texas 
compounding pharmacy stopped supplying the State with drugs for lethal injection after its identity 
was disclosed and it received “constant inquiries from the press” and “hate mail”). 
 371 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 245.005(f) (1989) (“Information regarding the 
licensing status of an abortion facility is an open record.”); id. § 139.6 (making records pertaining to 
inspection of abortion facilities open to public). 
 372 See William Saletan, Is Texas Covering Up After-Birth Abortions?, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2014) 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/saletan/2014/03/21/abortion_and_the_death_penalty_why_does_texas_
protect_pharmacies_that_sell.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BM9N-UNXK (noting Texas’s incon-
sistent approach to public disclosure in abortion and death penalty settings). 
 373 Some companies provide laboratory chemical analysis for the testing of pharmaceuticals. See, 
e.g., Analytical Chemistry and Materials Characterization Services, TRICLINIC LABS, http://
tricliniclabs.com/directory/solid-state-development-services/physical-and-analytical-chemistry/analy
tical-chemistry-and-pharmaceutical-materials-characterization-laboratory-services.html?gclid=CNud
59SYgb0CFZLm7AodSU0A9w, archived at http://perma.cc/F3N2-74VM (last visited Oct. 4, 2014); 
Excellence in Science: FDA & DEA Registered Analytical Laboratory, FLORA RESEARCH LABORA-
TORIES, http://www.floraresearch.com/first.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4DX9-HXUG (last visit-
ed Oct. 16, 2014). 
 374 See Johnson & Jones, supra note 113, at 14 (arguing that compounding pharmacies should be 
subject to validating testing procedures; Sellers Interview, supra note 107. 
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As with the procedural mechanisms already discussed, this approach 
would provide the court with crucial information about a lethal injection pro-
cedure’s safety without compromising the identity of the providing pharma-
cy.375 Admittedly, chemical drug testing cannot guarantee a painless execution, 
especially because states have not conducted foundational risk assessments 
closely examining the safety and efficacy of drugs in various doses and in var-
ious combinations for executions.376 Nevertheless, neutral chemical testing can 
identify chemical flaws or impurities that make the drugs act in unpredictable 
ways.377 Thus, this approach would reduce the unpredictability of the states’ 
drugs without obstructing executions using drugs that passed muster.  
From this perspective, inmates requesting the identity of providing phar-
macies do so at their own peril.378 Such requests have never been successful, 
and they may even bias a judge against the inmate’s case. Instead, the inmate 
should propose that the court, with the assistance of the parties, identify a neu-
tral, reputable drug tester to verify the chemical purity of the drugs. To ensure 
reliability, such testing should involve two separate steps. First, the tester 
should study the active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) that the compound-
ing pharmacy plans to mix to ensure that the active ingredients are what they 
claim to be and are not contaminated, degraded, or otherwise flawed.379 Sec-
ond, after the active ingredients have been mixed into the final product, the 
tester should examine the finished dosage form to test for sub-potency, super-
potency, and extrinsic contamination.380 
                                                                                                                           
 375 See Chollet & Jozwiakowski, supra note 105, at 8 (arguing that the “variability in quality” of a 
compounded injectable drug is essentially invisible to patients and health care practitioners); cf. 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1987) (asking whether there exists “a ready alternative that 
fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests . . . .”). 
 376 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1363 (discussing the lack of testing on the suitability of pento-
barbital for execution purposes); Sellers Email, supra note 105. 
 377 See J.H. Perrin, Comments on Drugs Difficult to Compound and the Quality of Chemicals to 
Be Used in Compounding, 25 DRUG DEV. & INDUSTRIAL PHARMACY 553, archived at http://perma.
cc/U36Q-4KPY?type=pdf (explaining that compounded intravenous compounded drugs should never 
be released without testing for sterility, pyrogens, and chemical analyses); Sellers Interview, supra 
note 107. 
 378 Cf. Fan, supra note 150, at 25 (arguing that states ought not be forced to disclose the identity 
of drug suppliers for executions). 
 379 See Jiben Roy, Pharmaceutical Impurities: A Mini-Review, AAPS PHARMSCITECH 1 (2002), 
http://www.aapspharmscitech.org, archived at http://perma.cc/ZE63-YVXM (arguing that impurities 
in APIs “even in small amounts may influence the efficacy and safety of the pharmaceutical prod-
ucts”); Sellers Interview, supra note 107. The “certificate of analysis” accompanying many ingredi-
ents used by compounding pharmacies includes a disclaimer that the packager does not vouch for its 
contents and, in the words of one expert, is “meaningless.” See Sellers Interview, supra note 107. 
 380 See Chollet & Jozwiakowski, supra note 105, at 2 (describing FDA test of compounded drugs 
indicating that 33% failed testing, mainly due to sub-potency or super-potency issues ranging from 
67.5–268.4% of the label claim); Sellers Interview, supra note 107; Sellers Email, supra note 105. 
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Although two-step testing may seem excessive, either step on its own is 
inadequate.381 Testing only the ingredients, quite obviously, cannot detect 
flaws in the final product.382 Likewise, testing only the finished dosage form 
cannot accurately determine whether some of a drug’s ingredients are com-
promised in a way that would cause pain or prevent the drug from working 
properly.383 For example, some ingredients may contain bacteria, fungi, or en-
dotoxins that can cause immediate reactions and pain, but may be undetected 
by tests of the finished product.384 By requiring these two steps, courts can 
properly determine if the state’s drugs have the chemical properties of the drug 
or drugs the state purports to use. This approach would help protect the in-
mate’s Eighth Amendment rights without jeopardizing capital punishment in a 
broader sense. 
Of course, other compounding pharmacies might eventually follow the 
lead of the Apothecary Shoppe and larger pharmaceutical corporations and 
refuse to supply drugs for use in executions.385 If, however, courts adopted the 
procedures suggested here, these developments, if they occurred, could not 
fairly be blamed on Eighth Amendment litigation.386 Drug manufacturers may 
be increasingly reluctant to allow their products to be used in executions,387 but 
that phenomenon is distinct from constitutional lawsuits. Death penalty oppo-
nents will continue to try to dissuade pharmacies and other companies from 
assisting states with executions, regardless of the legal arguments inmates ad-
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 385 See David Green, Compounding Pharmacies Called on to Make Execution Drugs, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/17/278389208/compounding-pharmacies-called-
on-to-make-execution-drugs, archived at http://perma.cc/KDN9-S4Z7 (discussing compounding 
pharmacies and executions). 
 386 Cf. Fan, supra note 150, at 23 (arguing that efforts to push out drug suppliers has made execu-
tions more dangerous); Boer Deng & Dahlia Lithwick, In the Push to Abolish Capital Punishment, 
Opponents of the Death Penalty Have Made It Less Safe, SLATE (May 9, 2014) http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/death_penalty_in_america_how_the_push_
to_abolish_capital_punishment_has.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7XFE-LKGB (same). 
 387 See Gibson & Lain, supra note 89, at 12–14; supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text. 
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vance in their lawsuits.388 Moreover, given the fact that there are about 56,000 
compounding pharmacies in the United States today,389 it is unlikely that they 
all would decide to stop supplying drugs for executions in the absence of legis-
lation forbidding the practice.390 
But even if compounding pharmacies all stopped supplying drugs for ex-
ecutions, states could still turn to other methods of executions. Indeed, some 
death penalty experts contend that other methods carry fewer risks than lethal 
injection.391 Some states are themselves beginning to explore alternatives to 
lethal injection. Tennessee, for instance, recently adopted a new law allowing 
the State to execute by electrocution if lethal drugs are unavailable or if lethal 
injection is deemed unconstitutional.392 Similarly, Oklahoma legislators are 
planning to study the possibility of using nitrogen gas for executions, and still 
other states are examining reviving the firing squad.393 Concerns about capital 
punishment’s survival, therefore, should not deter courts from abdicating their 
responsibility to determine whether execution procedures before them are con-
stitutional. 
                                                                                                                           
 388 See Pilkington, supra note 357 (quoting view that “pharmaceutical manufacturers have been 
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 390 See id. at 1375–76 (discussing recent legislation and proposed legislation that may interfere 
with compounding pharmacies supplying lethal drugs to states). It is also possible that the Internation-
al Academy of Compounding Pharmacists (IACP) could amend its Code of Ethics or Bylaws to try to 
eradicate the practice. See IACP BYLAWS, art. IX., § 1 (2014), available at http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/
www.iacprx.org/resource/resmgr/Docs/IACP_Bylaws_Revised_01312014.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/7GV2-A859 (last visited Oct. 4, 2014); IACP Code of Ethics, INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF COMPOUNDING PHARMACISTS, http://iacp.site-ym.com/?page=6, archived at http://perma.cc/
BG4N-95YA (last visited Oct. 4, 2014).  
 391 See Assoc. Press, Experts Argue Firing Squad Is a Humane Execution, KSL.COM, (June 16, 
2010) http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=11194774#S6LrA2I7ouH5JsFW.99, archived at http://
perma.cc/T9PS-9EWR (quoting death penalty experts suggesting that firing squad may carry fewer 
risks than lethal injection); Tom McNichol, Death by Nitrogen, SLATE (May 22, 2014) http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/05/death_by_nitrogen_gas_will_the_
new_method_of_execution_save_the_death_penalty.html?wpisrc=obinsite, archived at http://perma.
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someday replace lethal injection). 
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3. Resisting Delay 
States also often object to stays of execution that inmates sometimes re-
quest to study and challenge a state’s lethal injection procedure. States typical-
ly argue that temporary injunctions halting an imminent execution thwart the 
administration of justice, incur additional litigation expenses, and prolong the 
agony of victims’ families.394 A stay of execution, states emphasize, is usually 
justified only by “extraordinary” circumstances.395 Accordingly, courts fre-
quently reject the inmate’s request for a stay to examine execution procedures 
and assume that lethal injection litigation’s sole or primary goal is to prolong 
the inmate’s life, especially in the case of “eleventh hour” litigation.396 
Because the legal burden to obtain a stay of execution is high, the states’ 
arguments, in theory, seem compelling.397 In practice, however, the states’ be-
havior often precipitates the need for the stay, thus tilting the equities back in 
the inmate’s favor.398 For example, states often change their procedure days or 
weeks before a scheduled execution.399 In such instances, inmates who have 
diligently litigated in advance of the scheduled execution find themselves 
needing a last-minute stay to examine the new procedure.400 Admittedly, drug 
shortages may force states to change their plans as an execution approaches, 
but the mere fact that states have difficulty finding the drugs they plan to use 
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hardt, J., dissenting). 
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does not justify the denial of inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.401 If any-
thing, given that an excruciating execution is irreparable, the equities at this 
point should favor the plaintiff seeking the stay.402 
States also often obstruct inmates’ dutiful attempts to learn about an exe-
cution procedure for months or even years before an execution date. Courts are 
sometimes complicit in these efforts, dismissing early challenges to execution 
procedures as unripe and later challenges as barred by the statute of limita-
tions.403 States, then, try to trap inmates in a catch-22, by arguing that courts 
should treat early challenges as unripe and later ones as dilatory.404 In such 
instances, where the state itself has obstructed the inmate’s access to the execu-
tion procedure, the inmate’s constitutional interests should trump the state’s 
interests in the timely administration of justice.405 Indeed, if anything, the 
recognition of a due process right to information would obviate the need for 
stays of execution, because states would be forced to disclose execution proto-
cols earlier, thereby permitting courts to hear Eighth Amendment challenges 
without having to worry about interfering with an imminent execution. 
Of course, in other instances, where the inmate has been truly dilatory in 
challenging the state’s unaltered procedure, a court may be justified in denying 
a stay. It is worth noting, however, that in some cases the disclosure of an exe-
cution protocol will not delay an execution at all. For example, in Colorado, 
the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit against the Department of 
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preliminary injunction and finding that litigation was not a dilatory tactic because plaintiff raised a 
“legitimate and substantive” question about a new procedure that has not been reviewed by any court). 
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Corrections, challenging its practice of keeping its execution protocol secret as 
a violation of the State’s Administrative Procedure Act.406 The court permitted 
partial access to the protocol.407 Disclosure in that case did not necessitate any 
stays of execution; the case was about access to the procedure generally and 
not the constitutionality of a procedure intended for a particular inmate. Addi-
tionally, were courts to permit an inmate’s lethal-injection challenge before an 
execution date has been set, they would obviate the need to stay an execution 
to permit the litigation to continue. Thus, while the states’ interest in resisting 
delay may obstruct the inmate’s right to know in some cases, that interest will 
often be either irrelevant (because no delay would occur) or unpersuasive (be-
cause the state itself has created the need for delay). 
4. Resisting Frivolous Litigation 
States assert a final, related argument that frivolous litigation burdens 
states and courts, and judges should therefore protect state governments and 
the judiciary against such hassle and expense.408 As the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Baze, execution procedures in the United States have seemed to be-
come safer over time.409 Cognizant of this evolution, states may honestly be-
lieve that executions today are safe and that Eighth Amendment challenges to 
lethal injection therefore lack merit.410  
Many judges apparently share this initial reaction, especially when they 
have not closely examined the states’ lethal injection procedures themselves.411 
These judges may also fear that evidence of problematic execution procedures 
will result in a time-consuming investigation of complicated medical details 
beyond their expertise.412 Judges may not deliberately turn a blind eye to 
                                                                                                                           
 406 See ACLU v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., No. 13-CV-32325, slip op. at 6 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 1, 
2013), available at http://aclu-co.org/case/aclu-v-colorado-department-of-corrections, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SKT2-R4F2. 
 407 See id. at 9. 
 408 See, e.g., Mike Dorf, What’s a Technicality in the Death Penalty Context, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 
30, 2014), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/01/whats-technicality-in-death-penalty.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SFB6-LY8F (noting that courts tend to be skeptical of what they perceive to be “op-
portunistic” challenges to the death penalty). 
 409 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 62. 
 410 Cf. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 28, 28 (2007) (explaining that judges often base their decisions on initial intuitions rather than 
careful, reasoned reflection). 
 411 See Jeremy Fogel, In the Eye of the Storm: A Judge’s Experience in Lethal-Injection Litiga-
tion, 35 FORD. URB. L.J. 735, 736, 739–43 (2008) (recounting that judge was initially “extremely 
skeptical” about challenge to California lethal injection procedure but found several serious problems 
after carefully studying the procedure). 
 412 See Baze, 553 U.S. at 51 (noting that permitting an Eighth Amendment violation simply be-
cause the plaintiff has proffered “a slightly or marginally safer alternative . . . would embroil the 
courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise”). 
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claims they believe to be meritorious, but when faced with a difficult question, 
many judges will err on the side of deferring to the prison to avoid complicated 
litigation intruding in a sensitive state function.413 
States sometimes reframe these general concerns in legal terms that em-
phasize that due process is not unmeasured.414 Accordingly, states argue that 
even if inmates in these cases have a due process interest, the degree of process 
required decreases where the underlying constitutional claim lacks significant 
merit.415 This argument incorrectly assumes the invalidity of the inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment claim. The series of recent botched executions amply 
demonstrate that, far from being frivolous, inmates’ lethal injection challenges 
identify very serious risks inherent in lethal injection, especially in states with 
a history of problems.416 As explained above, these problems have not been 
limited to one method of lethal injection but rather have occurred in proce-
dures using one, two, and three drugs.417 Moreover, even states without a rec-
ord of visible botches still often use procedures riddled with dangers, including 
unpredictable drugs and a lack of expertise, transparency, oversight, and con-
tingency plans.418  
These various problems belie the notion that states can be trusted to fash-
ion safe procedures.419 Were a state to demonstrate that it had crafted a safe, 
problem-free execution procedure, perhaps it would have legitimate grounds to 
deem the inmate’s claims frivolous. In reality, though, most states cannot hon-
                                                                                                                           
 413 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (noting that “when accommodation of an 
asserted right will have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should 
be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 
452 U.S. 337, 362 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[C]ourts have been especially deferential to 
prison authorities ‘in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are 
needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” (quoting Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979))); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) 
(“[F]ederal courts have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison administra-
tion.”); Berger, supra note 40, at 2045–47, 209–92 (discussing Turner v. Safley’s inconsistent ap-
proach to deference); see also Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional De-
cision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 485–87 (2013) (discussing deference to prisons); Edward C. 
Dawson, Adjusting the Presumption of Constitutionality Based on Margin of Statutory Passage, 16 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 97, 107 (2013) (discussing various judicial practices that allow courts to avoid ad-
dressing difficult constitutional questions). 
 414 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259, 266 (1978). 
 415 Cf. Brewer v. Landrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 445 (“But speculation cannot substitute for evidence 
that the use of the drug is ‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering.’” (quot-
ing Baze, 553 U.S. at 50)); Beaty, 649 F.3d at 1074 (Tallman, Cir. J., concurring) (agreeing with the 
denial of rehearing). 
 416 See supra notes 50–140 and accompanying text.  
 417 See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
 418 See Berger, supra note 142, at 53–59. 
 419 See Denno, supra note 17, at 1339–45; Berger, supra note 22, at 263–73, 301–14; Berger, 
supra note 40, at 2082–84. 
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estly celebrate such a record. Indeed, the long history of serious lethal-
injection problems should demonstrate that courts hearing these cases should 
no longer afford states the benefit of the doubt. 
D. The Due Process Remedy 
Due process and Eighth Amendment principles together, then, should re-
quire states to share with inmates all the meaningful details of their execution 
procedures. This right to know should encompass the name of the drugs, neu-
tral chemical testing of all the drugs—or the names of the drugs’ manufacturer 
or compounder420—the steps the state will use to prepare and inject the drugs, 
the qualifications of the person charged with inserting the catheter into the in-
mate’s veins, the qualifications of the person assessing the inmate’s anesthetic 
depth, the qualifications of the other execution team members, the architecture 
of the execution facility, the equipment used during the procedure, the execu-
tion team’s training measures, the State’s contingency plans if one or more 
steps of the execution do not proceed as planned, and other material infor-
mation.421 Each of these factors can meaningfully affect the chances that an 
inmate will feel serious pain during his execution.422 A lethal injection proce-
dure that appears safe on paper can become excruciating if, inter alia, the 
state’s drugs are not what they are supposed to be, or if the catheter is not in-
serted properly into the inmate’s vein, or if an inmate is incorrectly deemed 
unconscious, or if the drugs are mishandled by prison staff, or if another mem-
ber of the execution team fails to do her job properly.423  
Just as the right to know should encompass all the material details of a 
state’s lethal injection procedure, so too should it include information about 
meaningful changes to that procedure. Initial information about an execution 
procedure’s details is worthless if the state subsequently changes that proce-
dure before the execution.424 While courts should not force states to relitigate 
the constitutionality of unaltered execution procedures already pronounced 
constitutional, they should require states to disclose all material changes to 
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their procedures so that inmates and judges can assess whether such changes 
heighten the risk of pain. As Judge Reinhardt argued in dissent: 
Why bother to properly administer a protocol that a court has held is 
constitutionally sufficient on its face, when you can just discard that 
protocol and adopt a new one on the eve of the execution? This way, 
Arizona has ensured itself a way of using a protocol that a court can 
“never” look at it in any serious fashion, and it can “flout” the re-
quirement for a constitutionally sufficient protocol “without fear of 
repercussion.”425 
E. Counter-Arguments 
Counter-arguments trying to undermine the due process right asserted 
here may have a surface appeal but are, on closer consideration, unpersuasive. 
First, states might argue that without the information requested, inmates do not 
have enough evidence of harm to satisfy the stringent pleading requirements 
erected by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly426 and in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.427 Collectively, those cases appear to en-
dorse “plausibility pleading,” which ostensibly imposes higher burdens on 
plaintiffs at the pleadings phase than had previously existed under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.428 Thus, the argument goes, without specific facts 
about a state’s lethal injection procedures, inmates do not know enough to 
bring an Eighth Amendment challenge that satisfies Rule 8’s demand for 
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusa-
tion.”429 
This argument misses the mark, because even without much information 
from the state, an inmate usually knows enough to plead a facially sufficient 
claim. For example, many states admit that they plan to use compounded 
drugs; they just withhold the name of the compounding pharmacy and the pre-
cise chemical properties of the drugs they use. Given dangers associated with 
compounded drugs and botched executions involving them, the plaintiff’s alle-
gation that the state plans to use compounded pentobarbital satisfies even Iq-
bal’s heightened pleading requirements.430 Of course, further inquiry such as 
neutral chemical testing could vindicate the safety of the state’s procedure, but 
the dangers of compounded pentobarbital are well known and serious enough 
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 430 See id. 
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that the state’s admission to using them should alleviate Twombly and Iqbal 
concerns. Similarly, given the well-recognized dangers of the three-drug proto-
col, inmates have sufficient cause to fear that states using that method will 
make mistakes heightening the risk of agonizing pain.431  
Second, and relatedly, some federal appellate courts have rejected in-
mates’ requests for information on the grounds that due process does not en-
compass a right to discover potential claims.432 This argument misunderstands 
both the relevant precedent and the plaintiffs’ contentions. For the proposition 
that due process does not include a right to discover claims, these courts cite 
Lewis v. Casey,433 in which the Supreme Court held that an inmate’s due pro-
cess right to access courts is not violated simply by establishing that “his pris-
on’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical 
sense.”434 Lewis, however, emphasized that the inmate’s right to access courts 
cannot be violated if he does not assert some actual injury—that is, unless the 
law library’s deficiencies actually frustrated an inmate’s substantive legal 
claim.435 The due process right to access courts, in other words, serves to safe-
guard other rights, and the Lewis plaintiffs at issue in this portion of the deci-
sion asserted no injury beyond the library’s shortcomings.436 By contrast, as 
explained above, in lethal injection litigation, inmates assert a due process 
right to information to protect their substantive Eighth Amendment right.437 
Even more to the point, these appellate courts’ contention misperceives 
the nature of the plaintiffs’ argument. Inmates do not seek information to dis-
cover potential claims. To the contrary, inmates challenging lethal injection 
procedures already assert non-frivolous Eighth Amendment claims resting up-
on genuine concerns about the safety of procedures that have gone awry before 
and could easily go awry again.438 When a lethal injection plaintiff invokes a 
due process right to information, he does so not to discover a new claim but to 
determine whether the details of his own state’s execution procedure heighten 
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or mitigate risks endemic to lethal injection. The history of botched executions 
and related problems detailed above plainly establish that lethal injection cre-
ates a risk of serious pain, thus raising a non-frivolous Eighth Amendment 
concern under Baze.439 Whether or not a particular state’s procedure poses a 
substantial risk, of course, is a fact-dependent inquiry, but when lethal injec-
tion plaintiffs seek information bearing on that question, they do not seek to 
discover claims but rather evidence relevant to a claim they already assert. In-
deed, as noted above, far from being extraordinary, the information they re-
quest should be available during the ordinary course of discovery.440 
Third, states might argue that courts have no business interfering in a sen-
sitive state function and imposing a judicial remedy. This argument underval-
ues the long-standing constitutional tradition, famously articulated in Marbury 
v. Madison, that the existence of a constitutional right presumes that some 
remedy must exist.441 Denying inmates the right to important information 
about execution protocols denies them any opportunity to receive a remedy for 
an Eighth Amendment violation. Significantly, for the Eighth Amendment right 
to have any force, there must exist at least a possibility of a pre-execution rem-
edy, such as an injunction prohibiting the state from using execution proce-
dures creating too high a risk of pain.442 Post-deprivation review does the in-
mate no good if he or she has already been executed. Moreover, if the inmate 
has, in fact, died an excruciating death, it is doubtful that any remedy can ade-
quately compensate his family.443 Whereas tort law often presumes that dam-
ages can compensate the victim or his family,444 it is unlikely such a plaintiff 
could recover. State sovereign immunity prohibits monetary awards against the 
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state in the absence of a statute waiving such immunity, and qualified immuni-
ty quite possibly also blocks suits against state officials.445 Furthermore, be-
cause the inmate is deceased, he cannot testify to his pain. Even more to the 
point, the unlikely possibility that a deceased inmate’s family could recover 
hardly offers adequate protection of the inmate’s Eighth Amendment right. 
It is true, of course, that the law does not always grant an injured plaintiff 
her preferred remedy,446 and immunity doctrines sometimes bar a remedy alto-
gether.447 But although constitutional remedies are sometimes disappointing to 
civil rights plaintiffs, as Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer have explained, 
“[e]ffective remedies have always been available for most violations of legal 
rights, and of constitutional rights in particular,”448 especially where no im-
munity bar interferes.449 In the constitutional sphere, this remedy usually con-
sists of an injunction. Because Eleventh Amendment immunity blocks retro-
spective monetary damages against the state,450 civil rights plaintiffs instead 
often seek prospective relief against state officers in the form of an Ex Parte 
Young action to enjoin those officials from violating the Constitution.451 
A Young action for injunctive relief is precisely the claim asserted by 
most individuals who fear that impending state action may violate their consti-
tutional rights. Indeed, a condemned inmate’s lethal injection action is, in es-
sence, a Young suit for equitable relief, requesting the court to order the state to 
provide information about the execution procedure and enjoin the state from 
executing him with an unconstitutional procedure. Constitutional remedies 
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may not offer everything that plaintiffs hope for, but, in lethal injection cases, 
the requested relief falls squarely within long-accepted judicial practices. 
Finally, the states may point out that Congress, signaling its frustration 
with prison litigation, sought to limit prisoners’ access to courts through the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act (PLRA).452 Neither of these statutes, however, prohibits in-
mates from receiving information about upcoming execution procedures. The 
Supreme Court has made clear that AEDPA’s gatekeeping provisions, which 
bar successive habeas petitions,453 do not apply to lethal injection claims 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.454 The PLRA requires that prisoner plaintiffs 
exhaust their administrative remedies,455 but it rarely obstructs courts from 
reaching the merits in lethal injection cases,456 and, in any event, can be satis-
fied merely by seeking administrative relief prior to filing suit. Accordingly, 
neither statute undermines inmates’ core due process right in lethal injection 
cases. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
A. Protecting Against Dangerous Execution Procedures 
These issues are hardly academic. On the contrary, protecting these due 
process norms would help make execution procedures safer in practice. When 
states operate behind a veil of secrecy, it is easier for them to cut corners and 
make mistakes that heighten the risk of pain.457 For example, when courts 
permit states to use compounded pentobarbital without any testing, they great-
ly increase the risk that the drug will be contaminated, ineffective, or otherwise 
flawed, thereby greatly increasing the risk of pain.458 Had a court required test-
ing of South Dakota’s compounded pentobarbital before Eric Robert’s execu-
tion, it would have learned that it was contaminated and could have prevented 
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his botched execution.459 Testing also would probably have identified problems 
with Oklahoma’s compounded pentobarbital, which likely caused problems 
with Michael Lee Wilson’s execution.460 
Similarly, when courts permit states to conceal details about the creden-
tials, training, and abilities of their execution team members, they heighten the 
risk that members will be unqualified and make grave mistakes. For instance, 
without access to important information about execution team members, it is 
impossible for inmates to learn that the person responsible for mixing the anes-
thetic is dyslexic and mixing the wrong amount, as occurred in Missouri for 
several years.461 Greater scrutiny of team member qualifications also helps 
inmates recognize whether state officials understand the drugs in question. For 
example, during the botched execution of Joseph Wood, Arizona injected fif-
teen times the standard dose of its drug.462  As one professor of anesthesiology 
remarked afterwards, “[t]hey’re making this up as they go along.”463 
Disclosure of procedure details can also help inmates discern whether the 
person charged with inserting the catheter into the inmate’s veins is qualified to 
do so.464 Faulty catheter insertions largely contributed to the grisly deaths of 
Angel Diaz in Florida and Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma.465 As noted above, 
Oklahoma’s protocol offered inadequate details about the qualifications and 
training of the person inserting the IV line,466 and clearly the person tasked 
with that job for Lockett’s execution did it badly. A preliminary autopsy report 
found that Mr. Lockett’s veins had been in “excellent condition,” but that the 
execution team had nonetheless made numerous failed attempts to set the IV 
before finally setting it improperly and ineffectively.467 And Oklahoma at least 
requires some training for setting the IV line. By contrast, other states provide 
either no or vague requirements for who may insert the catheter.468 Indeed, 
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even states that have had problems setting the IV line do not always immedi-
ately revise their protocol to specify the credentials of the person charged with 
performing that task. For instance, the protocol Florida adopted after the 
botched Diaz execution merely stated that “a designated member of the execu-
tion team” will insert the IV lines.469  
Disclosure of execution team member qualifications can also indicate 
whether the state has identified a competent person to assess the inmate’s anes-
thetic depth. Assessing anesthetic depth is especially important in states using 
the three-drug protocol because the second and third drugs are excruciating if 
the inmate is not properly anesthetized.470 Again, the Lockett execution is in-
structive. Though the Oklahoma protocol does state that a “physician . . . 
monitor the condemned offender’s level of consciousness,”471 it does not spec-
ify whether that physician must be trained in anesthesiology. Most non-
anesthesiologist doctors are not trained to monitor anesthetic depth,472 and it 
became horrifyingly evident after Lockett’s execution that not every doctor is 
capable of doing so correctly. Indeed, Oklahoma’s physician mistakenly 
deemed Lockett to be fully unconscious when he was not.473 
Disclosure of execution team contingency plans would also help. For ex-
ample, after repeated attempts to insert the catheter into various veins, Okla-
homa officials finally tried to access Lockett’s femoral vein. However, officials 
could not locate a catheter of the proper size for femoral access.474 Neverthe-
less, the physician used the catheter available, even though he had never before 
attempted femoral access with such a short one.475 Had Oklahoma been forced 
to disclose a contingency plan, it would have had to write one, and it may have 
anticipated this problem and provided its team with the necessary equipment to 
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attempt femoral access. Relatedly, greater disclosure of the State’s contingency 
plans (or lack thereof) could also have enabled Lockett’s lawyers to highlight 
that Oklahoma had an inadequate plan for the execution if the initial attempts 
to set the catheter failed. Put simply, greater transparency would help lawyers 
and judges discover the states’ shortcomings before botched executions. 
Even greater visibility during the execution itself could help prevent 
botched executions. During Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma concealed the 
catheter site with a sheet.476 Had the catheter access point been visible during 
the drug administration, the execution team would have been much more likely 
to discover the infiltration and prevent or mitigate an excruciating execution.477 
Finally, greater transparency may also encourage states to do a better job 
following their own protocols. States sometimes abandon their own procedures 
during executions, thus heightening the risk of mistakes.478 For example, Ari-
zona has deviated from its plans several times, including during the botched 
Wood execution.479 Missouri for many years also made haphazard changes to 
its procedure without telling anyone.480 Similarly, a federal district judge hear-
ing a challenge to the Ohio procedure noted that, “Ohio pays lip service to 
standards it then often ignores without valid reasons, sometimes with no phys-
ical ramification and sometimes with what have been described as messy if not 
botched executions.”481 
It is no coincidence that a state like Oklahoma, which prizes lethal injec-
tion secrecy so much that it threatened to defy its own State Supreme Court on 
the matter, botched two executions in the first four months of 2014. Of course, 
greater disclosure will not guarantee safe executions, but it would help inform 
inmates of the dangers presented by different lethal injection procedures. This 
information, in turn, would help inmates’ lawyers explain those dangers to 
courts, thus helping protect inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.  
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Along similar lines, states are more likely to take proper precautions 
when they know there will be external scrutiny of their actions.482 States today 
know their execution procedures will receive, at most, minimum external scru-
tiny, and they often make mistakes. Greater transparency would also allow 
states to get more external input from scientists and other experts to provide 
suggestions that may help make executions safer.483 Such precautions and ex-
ternal advice themselves would likely decrease the risk of botched execu-
tions.484 In short, the connection between transparency and safety is very re-
al.485 
B. Protecting Due Process and Discouraging Political Process Failures 
In addition to heightening the risk of excruciating executions, state secre-
cy violates core constitutional and democratic norms. Rather than embracing 
transparency and sunshine, states cower in secrecy. For their part, courts have 
been complicit, largely abdicating their duty to uphold the Constitution. The 
most dramatic example, perhaps, was the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which, 
after courageously halting upcoming executions, may have bowed to political 
pressure and permitted the State to proceed, resulting in Lockett’s horribly 
botched execution.486 Though federal courts are insulated from such direct po-
litical pressure,487 they too have been mostly unwilling to obstruct executions 
and anger public officials.488 Although courts are understandably sensitive to 
states’ concerns, their refusal to examine secret state procedures effectively 
bestows the judiciary’s blessing on bad government practices.489 
From this perspective, method of execution cases are just as much about 
fair process and good governance as they are about cruel and unusual punish-
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ment. Departments of corrections have designed and implemented lethal injec-
tion procedures without oversight, transparency, and, often, expertise.490 
Courts, nevertheless, usually defer to the states in these cases,491 even though 
the states are wholly undeserving of such deference.492 
Indeed, courts’ frequent dismissal of lethal injection cases is especially 
disturbing precisely because many states have demonstrated that they should 
not be trusted with these matters. Missouri’s track record over the past decade 
is symptomatic of a larger nationwide problem. When Missouri still used the 
three-drug protocol, it instructed its executioners to inject the drugs as quickly 
as possible, mistakenly believing that thiopental renders a person fully uncon-
scious within fifteen seconds.493 During this same period, it entrusted its pro-
cedure to a doctor, who lowered the amount of anesthetic and made other 
changes to the procedure without informing correctional authorities.494 This 
doctor later admitted to being dyslexic, conceding that he had no idea how 
much anesthetic he was preparing.495 Further exacerbating these problems, 
Missouri delegated “total discretion” over its procedure to this doctor496 and 
adopted no contingency plans to deal with problems that arose during execu-
tions. These problems created a very serious risk that Missouri was failing to 
anesthetize its inmates before injecting them with excruciating drugs,497 but the 
State further failed to monitor its inmates’ anesthetic depth to ensure that they 
were properly anesthetized.498 To top it all off, the State vigorously resisted all 
efforts to inquire into its execution methods.499 
Though the State’s ultimate decision to abandon the three-drug protocol 
in May 2012 was encouraging, its more recent actions inspire no more confi-
dence. Missouri has changed its execution protocol numerous times since May 
2012, including five times between August 1, 2013 and November 20, 2013.500 
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In some instances, the State has made changes less than a week before an exe-
cution.501 All the while, Missouri has resisted inquiries into its ever-changing 
plans, even though ample safety concerns abound. For example, Missouri has 
conducted several executions using untested compounded pentobarbital, de-
spite evidence of its dangers and problematic executions using the drug.502 
Perhaps most horrifyingly, as Judge Bye recounted in a recent dissent, 
“Missouri has a well-documented history of attempting to execute death row 
inmates before the federal courts can determine the constitutionality of the ex-
ecutions.”503 For example, Missouri executed Allen Nicklasson on December 
11, 2013 before the federal courts had completed review of his constitutional 
challenges to the State’s newly adopted procedure.504 Nevertheless, despite this 
history, trial courts and the Eighth Circuit routinely permit it to continue exe-
cutions with nary a glance at its practices.505 And that is just Missouri. Other 
states’ records are similarly suspect.506 
As noted above, courts’ repeated willingness to turn a blind eye to prob-
lematic state practices is likely driven by a variety of concerns, most funda-
mentally an unwillingness to interfere with the states’ administration of their 
death-penalty system.507 But in prioritizing these concerns, courts effectively 
let bad governmental practices fester, essentially sending states the message to 
go ahead and get away with what they can. All Americans have an interest in 
knowing whether the government is doing its job competently and constitu-
tionally.508 Without serious judicial review of the government’s actions, execu-
tive agencies like departments of correction can easily abuse their power be-
hind closed doors.509 In this and other areas, governments have a tendency to 
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over-classify, treating far more material as “secret” than necessary.510 If courts 
do not carefully scrutinize this purported need for secrecy, then nobody will. 
The judiciary’s collective willingness to bless even the most secretive, sketchy 
state procedures, then, should concern not only death penalty opponents but all 
of us. 
We are used to thinking of capital defendants and death-row inmates en-
joying some procedural protections not available to other criminal defendants 
and convicted felons.511 Perhaps because of these protections, some judges 
seem to think capital inmates have had more than their share of days in court 
and treat lethal injection claims as undeserving of further judicial scrutiny. 
Whether or not this impatience with capital litigation generally is well found-
ed, it may encourage some judges to abandon their duty to impartial constitu-
tional norms in these cases. It is hard to think of another set of cases in which 
the state government has announced its intent to harm individuals, who there-
fore bring § 1983 claims to protect a previously recognized constitutional 
right, only to be consistently told that they are entitled to absolutely no discov-
ery shedding light on their claims, even though the state possesses all infor-
mation pertinent to their claims and no immunity doctrine bars their actions.512 
It is similarly hard to think of a set of cases that so many courts reflexively 
treat as frivolous, despite so many well-publicized incidents suggesting other-
wise.513 
Of course, certain governmental interests, such as national security, some-
times justify secrecy.514 Even in that context, however, courts have found that 
the individual’s need for information weighs heavily in the judicial balanc-
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times justify governmental secrecy but suggesting reforms that could better balance security and 
transparency). 
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ing.515 States have no comparable interest in lethal injection cases, and yet 
courts often treat their interest in concealing their execution procedures as 
more sensitive than cases involving acutely sensitive matters like terrorism and 
national security.516 Moreover, to the extent that states arguably have legitimate 
reasons to keep secret some material pertaining to lethal injection, those inter-
ests can be accommodated while still granting plaintiffs access to information 
vital to their claims.517 
To this extent, courts should recognize that these cases are about much 
more than lethal injection. Indeed, they implicate the most fundamental norms 
of fair process and transparent, democratically accountable government.518 In 
deferring to even the most egregious state secrecy and suspicious or ill-
conceived state practices, courts offer deference to state governmental practic-
es that least deserve it.519 They also ignore core due process principles, deny-
ing inmates their right to a fair hearing, because such a hearing interferes with 
the majority’s calls that justice be done. Courts may think they are doing the 
right thing when they refuse to let inmates postpone their executions to inquire 
into lethal injection procedures, but by denying them fair process, they violate 
basic constitutional norms. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite a series of botched executions, federal and state courts often deny 
death row inmates’ requests to know crucial information about the method by 
which they will be executed. In so doing, they deny the inmates’ fundamental 
due process right to information, which is vital to protecting the inmate’s 
Eighth Amendment rights. Without access to important information about a 
state’s planned execution procedures, inmates have no way to protect them-
selves against an execution creating a substantial risk of serious pain. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized analogous rights to information that help indi-
viduals protect other substantive rights, and courts should do so here. 
By permitting states to execute inmates without disclosing key details 
about their lethal injection procedures, courts are not only denying inmates 
                                                                                                                           
 515 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 471–76 (4th Cir. 2004) (balancing in favor of 
the individual and ordering the government to produce information). 
 516 Compare id. (ordering the government to produce information on its execution protocols), 
with Bowersox, No. 14-1403, slip op. at 2 (affirming the district court’s denial of the petitioner’s mo-
tion for stay of execution without requiring the government to produce information on its execution 
procedures), and  Zink v. Lombardi, No. 12-04209-CV-C-BP, slip op. at 2–3 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 517 See supra notes 356–419 and accompanying text. 
 518 See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“[I]nformed public opinion is the 
most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”). 
 519 See Berger, supra note 142, at 52–55; Berger, supra note 40, 2061–67. 
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their Eighth Amendment due process rights but are also implicitly blessing 
states’ secretive and often unprofessional administration of their most solemn 
task. Courts have barely glanced at states’ recent turn to compounded drugs, 
despite evidence that such chemicals pose serious dangers and have, in fact, 
resulted in torturous executions. Courts similarly routinely refuse to inquire 
into three-drug procedures, even though it is undisputed that those procedures 
cause excruciating pain if administered improperly. Perhaps a more thorough 
inquiry into these matters would vindicate some states’ methods, but both 
states and courts have resisted such inquiries. In this way, courts effectively 
permit states to do what they want, thereby exacerbating the risk that their exe-
cution methods will cause excruciating pain. 
Courts and states’ concern that litigation will impede capital punishment 
is understandable, but it is also overstated. Courts can fashion procedures that 
minimize the costs to states while simultaneously permitting inmates to review 
execution procedures. By denying review altogether, however, courts are deny-
ing inmates’ core constitutional rights and allowing bad governmental practic-
es to continue. 
 
  
 
